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Thinking with Culture in Law and
Development
AMY J. COHENt

INTRODUCTION

This Article considers a renewed emphasis on culture
within law and development scholarship and practicewhat I term the "turn to culture." In the 1980s and 1990s,
rule-of-law projects, comprising a multi-billion dollar
development effort devoted to strengthening legal
institutions abroad, produced many disappointing results.'
In the wake of sobering assessments of the effects of these
t Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of
Law. I wish to thank Martha Chamallas, Ellen Deason, Garry Jenkins, Julieta
Lemaitre, Lauren Leve, Michelle McKinley, Debby Merritt, Alvaro Santos, Marc
Spindelman, Donald Tobin, and Annecoos Wiersema for engaging comments
and conversation, and to thank Catherine Atkins for research assistance. This
Article also benefited from airings in various forms at the "Global Law in
Comparative Perspective" Conference at Harvard Law School in 2007, the
Global Law Workshop at Duke Law School in 2008, the "After Empire"
Conference at Brown University in 2008, the "New Perspectives on Law and
Development" Conference at the Universidad de los Andes Faculty of Law in
2008, the Law & Society Conference in 2008, and the American Ethnological
Society Conference in 2008. Finally, I am especially grateful to Peter
Fitzpatrick for his written comments at a Law & Society panel, Genevieve
Lakier for sharing her original and unpublished fieldwork, and Janet Halley
and Ilana Gershon for their generosity and time.
1. Numerous legal scholars have documented the surge of rule-of-law
promotion efforts by international aid agencies, government institutions, and
philanthropic foundations, as well as their shortcomings in practice. See Bryant
G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries Through the New Law
and Development: Behind the Paradox of Consensus Programsand Perpetually
Disappointing Results, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383 (2002); see also THOMAS
CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 163-65, 170-76

(1999); Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
1998, at 95 (1998); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal
Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist
World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 180-81 (1999).
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projects, a number of committed law professors proposed
turning away from the purely institutional or technical
elements of rule-of-law promotion and towards an
exploration of the cultural and ideological forces
underpinning social change. More specifically, they invited
law and development scholars and practitioners to consider
whether changing local cultures could contribute to
achieving development and the rule of law.
In this Article, I assess what I call neocultural
interventionist proposals to promote the rule of law, 2 both
in academic publications, and their growing uptake in
development policy. 4 Neocultural interventionists argue
that transplanted laws, rules, and institutions are unlikely
to produce their intended social effects in divergent social
contexts or, for that matter, to produce any effects at all.
And they suggest changing the hearts and minds of
ordinary people in order to make these institutional reforms
more determinate and effective. They therefore aspire to
contextualize what they aptly describe as flawed
approaches to law reform-approaches that pay insufficient
attention to the individual culture-bearers who are law's
users. Both academic and programmatic versions of this
project agree that development programs should inculcate a
"rule of law culture" not only among legal elites but in the
everyday users of the legal system: "culture" must change
so that it perpetuates a readiness to turn to law and legal
institutions for solutions to conflict, an expectation that law
will be decisive, consistent, and fair, and a willingness to
abide by legal outcomes even when they fall short of what

2. I use the term "neo" in neocultural to suggest that contemporary
proposals for culture change interventions represent both a new form of law and
development practice and a renewal of older approaches to development that
associate transformations in individual consciousness with modernization and
social change. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Max Weber, Talcott Parsonsand the
Sociology of Legal Reform: A Reassessment with Implications for Law and
Development, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 383 (2006).
3. See JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE
RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 310-46

(2006); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and
the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003); Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47
VA J. INT'L L. 357 (2007); Jane Stromseth, Post-Conflict Rule of Law Building:
The Need for a Multi-Layered, Synergistic Approach, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1443, 1450-60 (2008); see also infra note 94.
4. See infra notes 95-100.
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might be imagined possible through violence. Development
professionals should, neocultural interventionists propose,
install these ideas in ordinary individuals by directly
teaching and promoting them. The predicted benefit is an
increase in reliance on and compliance with the legal
system.
I do not challenge these development ideals. Instead, I
question the particular conceptualizations of culture that
underlie them, and I explore the potential consequences of
deploying these conceptualizations of culture as the basis of
new development projects. Neocultural interventionists
first configure culture as a mental domain. They think that
culture is the values and beliefs that individuals in the field
have about law and development-I call this culture as
consciousness. They presuppose that local culture, in this
sense, may be indifferent to the rule of law, and that it can
be changed by their interventions to be permeated by a
this
that
suggest
I
consciousness.
rule-of-law
conceptualization of culture as consciousness can produce
significant limitations and forms of misrecognition: it can
encourage development professionals to diagnose various
problems of failed law as problems of failed consciousness;
to (mis)identify actual people as lacking adequate legal
consciousness; and to envision a relatively straightforward
relationship between changing consciousnesses and
changing behavior, when the desires people articulate and
the practices they enact are far more paradoxical,
contradictory, and contentious than this analysis would
allow.
Neocultural interventionists also configure culture as a
behavioral domain. They reason that conscious values and
beliefs can produce a set of self-disciplining rules that shape
individuals' behavior, their social relations, and their social
practices in reasonably (although not uniformly) predictable
ways. I call this culture as lawlike rules. Culture, in this
second sense, is a grid of prescriptions guiding behavior.
This imagines culture to be like law: culture is the set of
lawlike rules that condition people to have respect for and
comply with the rules of law themselves. I suggest this
conceptualization of culture-constructed as the metalaw of
law, if you will-is unlikely to remedy the indeterminacies
and ineffectiveness of programs to promote the rule of law.
Instead, it is likely to generate a new set of problems, or
rather, revive old problems in new forms.
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Anthropologists, who have long warned against using
culture as a prescriptive tool of social change, are much
more familiar with the limitations of both these
conceptualizations of culture than lawyers. 5 And it is to
anthropologists that I turn in this Article for help in
articulating them. I ask here: what cautions do they offer,
and how do their ethnographically grounded accounts of
culture suggest that lawyers should approach culture
change projects? As we shall see, ethnographic analyses of
development challenges suggest that local populations may
be highly receptive to law but put law to surprising uses
directly contrary to the rule-of-law agenda; they can set law
against itself; they can use obedience to law and the
legitimacy it bestows to sharpen conflict, promote local
unrest, and mobilize violent social struggles. To understand
what any "turn to culture" actually may have to grapple
with, it may therefore be useful to complicate considerably
the neocultural interventionist's picture not only of culture
but also of law.
This Article, then, does not seek to pursue the familiar
criticism of development interventions for imposing western
5. Many anthropologists have expressed caution about whether and how the
concept of culture can be mobilized to change or improve other people's lives.
For a few recent examples, see generally CHARLES L. BRIGGS WITH CLARA
MANTINI-BRIGGS, STORIES IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA: RACIAL PROFILING DURING A

MEDICAL NIGHTMARE (2003) (arguing against using an anthropological discourse
of culture to inform institutional responses to a public health crisis in
Venezuela); Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights Law and the Demonization of
Culture (And Anthropology Along the Way), POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV.,
May 2003, at 55, 63 (2003) (warning against a "general tendency to culturalize
problems," such as interpreting inequalities "in terms of cultural practices that
suppress [women and minorities] rather than the economic or political problems
their communities face"); Vilma Santiago-Irizarry, Culture as Cure, 11
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (1996) (critically analyzing how medical
professionals deployed the concept of culture to improve medical treatment of
Hispanic
patients); Susan Wright,
The Politicization of 'Culture,'
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1998, at 7, 11-12 (1998) (arguing against the ways
in which management consultants are using anthropological ideas of culture to
propose new flexible forms of organization and worker self-understandings).
Anthropologists Ilana Gershon and Janelle Taylor in fact suggest that many
contemporary anthropologists "have for the most part abandoned" the culture
concept on the grounds that culture "produced the wrong kinds of
generalizations, hid history and relations of power, escaped satisfactory
definition, smuggled in assumptions about race and gender, and revealed an
inaccurately simple and uniform bounded logic." Ilana Gershon & Janelle S.
Taylor, Introduction to "In Focus: Culture in the Spaces of No Culture," 110 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 417, 418 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
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cultural values.6 Indeed, the culture change proposals I
examine should not be dismissed on these grounds. Any
development intervention is normative and non-neutral
and, to their credit, neocultural interventionists are
remarkable in their willingness to describe development not
simply as a process of institutional reform, but rather as a
cultural process aimed at constituting individual subjects
themselves-here as legal subjects who want to be bound by
the dictates of the rule of law. 7 In order, then, to advance a
discussion beyond a general normative preoccupation with
whether culture change is itself a good or bad thing, I
devote this Article to examining how a group of law
professors propose to use culture as an analytic tool to
produce programmatic knowledge about development
beneficiaries and to fashion interventions in particular local
contexts with the aim of strengthening law. I do so in order
to encourage critical reflection on the relation between the
prescriptive deployment of culture, on the one hand, and
actual development challenges in specific social, historical,
and political contexts, on the other hand.
In Part I of this Article, I trace the role of culture in law
and development beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, with
the first wave of reforms, and then I examine contemporary
scholarship in order to set forth the relations among law,

6. For examples of scholarship that do pursue this argument, see Mohan
Gopalan Gopal, Law and Development: Toward a PluralistVision, 90 AM. SoC'y
INT'L L. PROC. 231, 233 (1996) ("iTihe law and development movement should

set as its main objective the protection of the freedom of states and people to
choose their social and cultural norms and values (including their legal
systems) in accordance with rules of international law .... It should not be the

vehicle for promotion of any particular set of national cultural and social
norms.") (footnote omitted); Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The
Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 207 n.25 (2001) ("What is
needed is not the imposition of a single culture's template of human dignity but
rather the mining of all cultures to craft a truly universal human rights
corpus.").
7. For example, Brooks writes, "It should go without saying that the project
of intervening in 'other' cultures in order to change and 'improve' them is a
fundamentally arrogant and imperialist project, with many pitfalls.
Nonetheless, I do not think it is a project we can abandon. . .

."

Brooks, supra

note 3, at 2339. Cao writes, "My proposal to go beyond law and modernizing law
to culture and culture change will undoubtedly smack some of Orientalism. ...
[P]romoting cultural attributes that would facilitate the establishment of a
liberal market society [will be suspect for some law and development scholars]."
Cao, supra note 3, at 379.
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culture, and ordinary people that the culture concept
encodes in the neocultural interventionist project. In Part
II, I argue that neocultural interventionists deploy a
conceptualization of culture paradoxically analogous to the
conceptualization of law that the turn to culture was meant
to correct. In the 1980s and 1990s, a second wave of
reformers envisioned law as an explicit set of social rules
capable of shaping social practices in reasonably
predictably ways. When transplanting law imagined in this
way into the developing world proved sometimes futile or
counterproductive, neocultural interventionists recommended
fixing the culture-and imagined culture, like law, as an
explicit set of social rules capable of shaping social practices in
reasonably predictably ways. Neocultural interventionists
thus analogized the societies they sought to reform to, quite
literally, the minds of ordinary individuals in those
societies-for them, both societies and minds became
subject to the rule of law.
In Part III, I illustrate some of the descriptive
limitations and even prescriptive dangers of relying on an
image of culture that tracks so closely the rule-of-law image
of law, by drawing on two suggestive ethnographic
examples from Nepal-a country that by virtually all
accounts lacks robust governance by the rule of law and
that has been the recipient of significant rule-of-law
development funding. The first example involves people
demanding, through street protest, that the state allocate
risk and oversee compensation for injuries resulting from
everyday traffic accidents. The second example involves
village women who have cast their lot with Maoist
insurgents in order to achieve, as they claim, values such as
equality and social justice. Neither the street protesters nor
the village women lack belief in law or development;
instead both are avid promoters of law and development.
These examples all involve people who profess the kinds of
values and beliefs that rule-of-law aid practitioners wish to
instill, yet who nonetheless behave in ways that befuddle
rule-of-law ends, and whose desires, values, and beliefs
have done little, it appears, to actually produce the rule of
law in institutionally cognizable forms. If the street
protesters and village women simply lacked belief in law or
development, then converting them to new ideological
positions consistent with the rule of law might appear more
straightforward.
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I conclude by suggesting that the turn to culture in law
and development is an effort to enable ordinary citizens to
instill within themselves normative desires for particular
configurations of modern legal rules, processes, and
institutions. This may be a compelling way to envision
development: empowering individuals from the bottom-up
to embrace and embody institutional reform through
culture change. But, as my examples from Nepal suggest,
this vision, at least when abstracted from ethnographic
description, can remain strikingly disconnected from the
politics and conflict of everyday life.
I. THE CULTURE CONCEPT IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT

A. A Brief HistoricalOverview
Culture was a core analytical concept of the (now
retronym) "first-wave" law and development movement
when U.S. legal scholars talked about the cultural attitudes
of their third world legal counterparts, and regarded them
as objects and agents of change. In the 1960s and 1970s,
first-wave scholars labored to introduce third world legal
elites to the ideals and instrumental reasoning of American
legal realism. Working in Latin America and Africa with
grants from western foundations and universities, these
scholars believed that law could be used as a means to
advance state-led economic growth.8 A key obstacle, as they
understood it, was that third world legislators, lawyers,
judges, and law professors had been enculturated to hold a
set of attitudes, beliefs, and expectations about law marked
by a high degree of formalism. As a result, these third world
actors produced, defended, and expounded upon laws by
referencing abstract and rigid internal rules that were out
of touch with social needs and that were, consequently,
often ignored. As first-wave law and development scholars
perceived it, this state of affairs was paradigmatically not
modern. 9

8. David M. Trubek, The 'Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past,
Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 74, 75 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
9. For scholarship analyzing the influences of modernization theory on firstwave law and development, see Lan Cao, Law and Economic Development: A
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Because first-wave scholars reasoned that economic
development could flow from the achievement of an "antiformal, 'rule-skeptical"' instrumentalist legal culture, 10
producing modern legal subjects via projects of culture
change was among their central aims. In David Kennedy's
telling:
"Blind rule following and unimaginative
bureaucratic habits were preventing law in the books from
realizing its potential in action. The solution was to build a

more pragmatic and antiformalist local legal culture ....11

Or, in David Trubek's summary, "the most important thing
to do was to create a new, more instrumental legal
culture."12
A key metaphor of the times was the lawyer as social
engineer. 13 First-wave scholars aimed to create legal
professionals trained to inquire about social and economic
needs and interests and to fashion laws that could mediate
and advance those needs and interests on the ground. 14 In
this sense, the model of culture change that first-wave
scholars exported involved encouraging particular ways of
thinking about law as a set of problem-solving techniques,
and, more literally, as the very set of techniques that could
New Beginning?, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 545, 546-51 (1997) (book review); Brian Z.
Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
470, 471-76 (1995) (review article). See also Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matterfor
Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 829, 831
(2000) (review essay).
10. JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN
AID IN LATIN AMERICA 4 (1980); see also David M. Trubek, Toward a Social
Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1,
7-8 (1972).

11. David Kennedy, The 'Rule of Law,"Political Choices, and Development
Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at
95, 112.
12. Trubek, supra note 8, at 76.
13. For the origins of this metaphor, see Roscoe Pound, The Scope and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt. 3), 25 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1912). See

also Dennis 0. Lynch, Hundred Months of Solitude: Myth or Reality in Law and
Development?, 1983 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 223, 236-37 (review essay) (discussing
Karl Llewellyn's "portrait of the lawyer as social engineer").

14. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change:
On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement,
25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 465-66 (1977); see also Elliot M. Burg, Law and

Development: A Review of the Literature & a Critique of "Scholars in SelfEstrangement," 25 AM. J. COMP.L. 492, 505-06 (1977); Trubek, supra note 10, at

38.

20091

THINKING WITH CULTURE

519

be used to promote economic growth. 15 To that end, in 1971,
a group of law professors funded by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) initiated an
ambitious research project to study, among other things,
the relationship between culture and legal change. 16 Mining
newspapers and legal periodicals in six nations beginning
at the end of World War II, they examined "legal culture" or
what they described as the attitudes that legal elites as well
as ordinary individuals held towards law. They aimed to
make these attitudes explicit and knowable though
empirical study and then to plot these variables in relation
to each other and17 in relation to legal systems and social
change over time.
Many scholars have studied the effects of this
movement, and by various accounts these effects were both
too generative and not generative enough. As Trubek
explains: "In some cases, the transplants did not 'take' at
all: some of the new laws promoted by the reformers
remained on the books but were ignored in action. In
others, laws were captured by local elites and put to uses
different from those the reformers intended."'1 8 Some of the
movement's early pioneers therefore replaced their
confidence in exporting an anti-formalist legal culture with
consideration of a host of other contextual factors. For
example, some scholars became concerned that fostering a
cultural understanding of law as an instrument could, in
political contexts that lack robust democratic participation,
transform law into the handmaiden of authoritarian
governments. 19 These scholars also questioned the

15. On literalization or "the transformation of a metaphor into an object,"
see Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the CulturalStudy of Law: Taking on the
Technicalities,53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 1009, 1021-24 (2005).
16. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA: A
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY at v-vi, 27-

29 (1979); John Henry Merryman, Law and Development Memoirs II.SLADE,
48 AM. J. CoMP. L. 713, 722-24 (2000).
17. Merryman, supra note 16, at 723-24.
18. Trubek, supra note 8, at 78-79.
19. See Trubek, supra note 10, at 19-21; see also GARDNER, supra note 10, at
101, 118, 271-75; David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in SelfEstrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies
in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062, 1076.
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ethnocentricity (and efficacy) of projects to transform the
ways in which foreign legal elites understood law,
particularly in light of little visible reform. 20 In addition to
attacking the first-wave movement's cultural approach, a
number of Left scholars also attacked the movement's
cultural critique from the perspective of the international
political economy. These critical theorists called for
attention to the ways in which law and development itself
promoted global economic relations to the detriment of
third world states. 21 For example, Francis Synder criticized
James Gardner for relying on cultural explanations
("American ethnocentrism," "flawed [American] legal
models," "resistance of Latin American legal culture") to
make sense of the movement's failures, rather than
examining the relations among the law and development
movement, existing patterns of dependency, and the
dynamics of global capitalism. 22 By the mid-1970s, however,
the movement largely dissipated on its own accord. As
Trubek explains, "[T]here was disillusion in the academy,
foundation interest declined, and the official aid agencies
showed no interest in moving into legal reform. So, for the
moment, the [law and development] movement seemed to
20. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 16, at 459-60, 479-81; Trubek &
Galanter, supra note 19, at 1063-64, 1080. See generally GARDNER, supra note
10.
21. See, e.g., David F. Greenberg, Law and Development in Light of
Dependency Theory, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 129, 131, 136-38 (1980); Francis G. Snyder,
Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 14 LAW & SOCUY REV.
723 (1980); Francis G. Snyder, The Failure of "Law and Development," 1982
WIs. L. REV. 373, 390 [hereinafter Failure of "Law and Development'l (reviewing
GARDNER, supra note 10). Some of these scholars turned to international law to
argue that developed states owed a set of obligations to developing states. A
good example of this trajectory can be found in Anthony Carty's 1992 edited
volume, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT at v-vi (Anthony Carty ed., 1992). Carty
juxtaposes 1970s articles organized under the heading, "Law and
Modernisation: The Legal Imperialism Debate," with 1980s articles under the
headings 'The Debate About the Right to Development as a Human Right..."
and "International Law and Development." Id. Scott Newton notes the irony:
"Oddly enough, given the Marxian, materialist pretensions of [these critical]
theorists, the right to development all but reverses the law/economy polarity,
subordinating economic logic and the relations of production to legal logic, and
rights logic at that." Scott Newton, The Dialectics of Law and Development, in
THE NEW LAw AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 174, 186; see also
Cao, supra note 9, at 556; Tamanaha, supra note 9, at 479.
22. See Failure of "Law and Development," supra note 21, at 390; see also
Greenberg, supra note 21, at 131, 136-38.
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have run out of steam. 23
For a variety of reasons that are both well-studied and
beyond the scope of this Article, in the late-1980s exporting
law abroad became a good idea again-and at a scale "far
eclipsing even the wildest dreams of the [first-wave law and
development] pioneers." 24 Suffice it to say that two
simultaneous forces-"'the project of markets"' and 'the
project of democracy"'---converged in that period around
their support for strong legal institutions. 25 The markets
project championed legal institutions to achieve stable legal
environments attractive to foreign investors; the democracy
project sought to achieve national enforcement of civil,
political, and human rights, and it was widely thought that
they could both proceed in tandem. 26 To that end, the ruleof-law aid community adopted a standard set of institutionbuilding activities aimed at upgrading judiciaries, law
enforcement, legal education, and commercial and criminal
law.

27

Scholars reflecting upon this second-wave period have
'28
characterized its approach to law reform as "formal.
Neocultural interventionist scholars, in particular, have
criticized second-wave reformers for placing excessive faith
in the simple idea that the establishment of a correct set of
23. Trubek, supranote 8, at 78.
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id. at 84.
26. See id. at 84-85. Thomas Carothers similarly credits the expansion of
rule-of-law promotion to the "irresistible apparent connection of the rule of law
with the underlying goals of market economics and democracy that now
constitute the dual foundation of contemporary international aid." Thomas
Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD
15,27-28 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
27. See

CAROTHERS,

supra note 1, at 165-69.

28. For example, David Kennedy describes how second-wave reformers
aspired to establish the correct set of rules and private rights to facilitate
market activity (bolstered by judicial enforcement of these rules and rights).
Kennedy, supra note 11, at 138-42. Although Kennedy notes that this approach
also included instrumental policy analysis, he contrasts it with "the pragmatic
and flexible antiformalism" of the first-wave movement. Id. at 141. Trubek
similarly observes that "[i]ronically, both the market builders and the
democracy promoters showed a faith in formalism," for example, that judges
could "resolve all questions without resort to ideology, politics, or even policyoriented balancing," even as both promoted "instrumental thought and greater
sensitivity to policy concerns." Trubek, supranote 8, at 85-86.
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forms (or rules or institutions) would naturally produce a
desired set of social norms 29-a faith that, as Scott Newton
observes, "is actually rather curious, given the extent to
which legal formalism had long since been subjected to a
wide variety of critiques" (including critiques by first-wave
law and development scholars themselves). 30 What I find
most striking about this second-wave period, however, is
that the first-wave idea of culture as an analytic construct
with which the law and development community felt
compelled to think had all but receded from the scene. Tom
Ginsberg, for example, notes that the first wave's "emphasis
on cultural factors" was supplanted by the second wave's
emphasis on "technical institutional arrangements," 31 and
Kerry Rittich observes, "against politics
and culture, law
32
[was] identified with efficient markets."
Nothing requires us to distinguish law as a set of forms,
instruments, and techniques from law as a product of
culture. However, as Annelise Riles suggests, drawing this
distinction can be symptomatic of the ways in which legal
scholars construct knowledge about law. 33 If we indeed tend
to distinguish between these two broad understandings of
law, then perhaps it is unsurprising that, in the wake of
mounting evidence that institutionally grounded and
"formal" projects of law reform were failing to achieve their
intended effects, 34 law and development scholars and
29. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 3, at 2284 ("[Riule-of-law promotion efforts
continue to focus on establishing the formal dimensions of the rule of law,
assuming with little evidence that this will lead reliably and predictably to the
emergence of a robust societal commitment to the more substantive aspects of
the rule of law."); see also Cao, supra note 3, at 369-70.
30. Newton, supra note 21, at 190-91.
31. Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 833.
32. Kerry Rittich, Who's Afraid of the Critique of Adjudication?: Tracing the
Discourse of Law in Development, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 929, 934 (2001).
33. See Riles, supra note 15, at 973-74.
34. See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 26, at 28 n.5 (citing a USAID review of
its rule-of-law programs, Harry Blair & Gary Hansen, Weighing in on the Scales
of Justice: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Rule of Law Programs,
USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 27, Feb. 1994); see also
Garth, supra note 1, at 384. Garth cites several studies, including: LINN A.
HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); LAWYERS COMM. FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS & VENEZUELAN PROGRAM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION AND
ACTION, HALFWAY TO REFORM: THE WORLD BANK AND THE VENEZUELAN JUSTICE
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practitioners again turned to cultural vocabularies as a
means of catalyzing change. Some emphasized a 'will to
reform' in mostly general terms. 35 Others called for more
nuanced and context-specific examinations of law in minds,
so to speak. For example, Thomas Carothers, founder and
director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes:
Clearly law is not just the sum of courts, legislatures, police,
prosecutors, and other formal institutions with some direct
connection to law. Law is also a normative system that resides in
the minds of the citizens of a society. As rule-of-law providers seek
to affect the rule of law in a country, it is not clear if they should
focus on institution building or instead try to intervene in ways
36
that would affect how citizens understand,use, and value law.

Along these lines, some contemporary law and
development scholars and practitioners have turned away
from state-focused institutional reforms and towards
development interventions that are more local in scale and
more concerned with how ordinary individuals experience
law in their everyday lives. To that end, a growing number
now champion projects of "legal empowerment"-what
Vivek Maru describes as a shift from aiding "state
SYSTEM (1996); Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial
Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule
of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 28,
2002), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/fileswp28.pdf; Human
Rights First, Building on Quicksand: The Collapse of the World Bank's Judicial

Reform Project in Peru, Apr. 2000, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
pubs/descriptions/perubuilding.htm.

35. See Carothers, supra note 26, at 22 ('CThe sobering experience with the
early wave of efforts to promote institutional change produced ...

a great deal

of attention to what quickly came to be called 'will to reform."'). Rachel
Kleinfeld similarly describes a phenomenon among aid practitioners who "often
talk about the importance of finding 'political will' for rule-of-law reforms."
Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 26, at 31, 35; see also Garth, supra note 1, at
384 ('The lack of success is also attributed frequently to a lack of political will,
requiring more 'stakeholders' in the judiciary or government, [and] more
monitoring and pressure from 'civil society' ....).
36. Carothers, supra note 26, at 20 (emphasis added). Jennifer Beard
describes Carothers' analysis as "a call to examine rule of law development as a
disciplinary practice aimed at constituting subjects willing to accept . . .
Western liberal democratic values."). Jennifer Beard, The Confessional
Framework of Rule of Law Development: How to Offer Salvation to Willing
Legal Subjects, 75 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 409, 411 (2006).
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institutions" to "directly assisting ordinary people,
especially the poor," 37 and what Stephen Golub
recommends as a mainstream "alternative to the
problematic, state-centric rule-of-law orthodoxy," which
strengthens civil society actors to engage proactively with
government agencies. 38 This emphasis, moreover, has clear
analogues
in programmatic
literature:
the Asian
Development Bank, for example, now recommends bottomup legal empowerment as a means of increasing "the control
that disadvantaged populations exercise over their lives"
and imparting 'critical consciousness' . . [to] women, the
poor, and other marginalized groups." 39 The Bank, in fact,
reasons that transformations in individual consciousness
will generate "higher-level institutional and procedural
reforms.., by mobilizing collective capacity and demand. '40
This emphasis on the ordinary poor as agents of legal
change has converged with the contemporary turn to
culture. 41 Neocultural
interventionists
reason that
37. Vivek Maru, Between Law and Society: Paralegalsand the Provision of
Justice Services in Sierra Leone and Worldwide, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 428
(2006).
38. Stephen Golub, The Legal Empowerment Alternative, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD supra note 26, at 161, 161-62. For other examples of law
and development scholars and projects that express ethical and pragmatic
sensibilities in favor of localism, decentralization, and bottom-up stakeholder
participation, see Richard Cameron Blake, The World Bank's Draft
Comprehensive Development Framework and the Micro-Paradigmof Law and
Development, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 159 (2000); Steven D. Jamar, A
Lawyering Approach to Law and Development, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
31 (2001); Thomas F. McInerney, Law and Development as DemocraticPractice,
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 109 (2005).
39. ASIAN DEV. BANK, LAw AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK 7 (2001), available at http://www.adb.org/documents/others/Law_ADB/
lpr_2001.pdf. Cf. COMM'N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, MAKING THE
LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE: VOLUME 1 (2008), available at http://www.undp.org/
legalempowerment/reports/concept2action.html (describing legal empowerment
of the poor as a development strategy).
40. ASIAN DEV. BANK, supranote 39, at 8-9.
41. Development organizations today increasingly champion ordinary
individuals as catalysts of legal, social, and economic change--responsible for
both monitoring and producing a range of development ideals. The World
Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)is a good example. The
Bank emphasizes participatory processes, "holistic" bottom-up development
priorities, and public-private partnerships. World Bank, Comprehensive
Development Framework, http://go.worldbank.org/O3CN35INYO (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009). Some scholars see this turn to civil society and the ordinary poor
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transplanted law and legal institutions stand outside
culture and cannot achieve their intended effects without
the "culture" of law's ordinary users. Culture thus appears
as a tool to take law-formal and acultural-and to
translate it into something that is specific, local, embedded
in individual consciousness, and hence powerful.
Thus, on the one hand, the contemporary turn to
culture may reflect a recurring effort within law and
development to use culture to correct approaches to law
that seem too formal. On the other hand, changing ideas
about law and development itself significantly shift the
image of culture and the ends to which it is recruited in
development policy. First-wave reformers viewed culture
change primarily as a project of transforming how third
world legal elites thought about law in order to encourage a
less formalist and more instrumental approach. The
ultimate aim of first-wave culture change projects was to
enable legal elites to envision and use law instrumentally
as a tool to produce economic growth. 42 By contrast,
neocultural interventionists do not describe formality as an
anachronistic way of thinking about law-that is, as a set of
internally coherent legal forms disconnected from the
promotion of particular policy ends. Rather, they describe
formality as a set of legal forms disconnected from culture,
or, more accurately, they describe formality as legal forms
disconnected from ordinary people who believe these forms

as a means to "fill the vacuum left by the restructuring of the welfare state
mandated by economic liberalization processes in countries around the world."
KATHARINE NEILSON RANKIN, THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF MARKETS: ECONOMIC
LIBERALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEPAL 22 (2004). For critical assessments

of some of these efforts, see Julia Paley, The Paradox of Participation:Civil
Society and Democracy in Chile, 24 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 1 (2001)
(describing how development ideas of civil society, local empowerment, and local
participation were used to justify reductions in public expenditures for social
services in democratic Chile). See also JUDE HOWELL & JENNY PEARCE, CIVIL
SOCIETY AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL EXPLORATION (2001) (exploring, through
extensive case studies, the politics, relations of power, and both regressive and
progressive possibilities that can flow from development efforts to strengthen
civil society).
42. See, e.g., Trubek, supra note 10, at 8 (describing reasoning prevalent
during the first-wave movement: "The more law becomes a mechanism or an
instrument to advance rationally toward specified goals, the more effective it
will become. This will be achieved, it is argued, only if the legal culture
embraces an instrumental conception of law which fosters the clarification of
economic goals and their relationship to the legal system.").

526

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

have power. 43
One consequence of this shift is that contemporary
culture change projects envision a more tentacular reach
into the population-a shift in agents from third world elite
judges, lawyers, and legislators to virtually everyone. This
new ambition likely also reflects the expansive role that law
now plays in development discourse writ large. Law, as
many others have noted, is no longer simply a means to
produce economic growth. 44 As Amartya Sen famously
argued, "even if legal development were not to contribute
one iota to economic development ... even then legal and
judicial reform would be a critical part of the development
process.' 45 Law today is its own end of development, and
ordinary people are now a means and end of achieving
development directly. And culture offers the promise-or at
least that evidence-that rule-of-law promotion has been
made internal or, as Peter Fitzpatrick aptly puts
it, that
46
law can 'regulate [its subjects] from the inside.'
Hence, my descriptive claim is this: for contemporary

43. See generally infra Part I.B.
44. Of course, there is now a significant literature that debates the relation
between law and economic growth. For a few important contributions, see
generally LAw, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999); KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A.
WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 (1999); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and
Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER
117 (1999); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law
Project, Working Paper No. 30, 2002), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/
wps/upf01/upf01.pdf.
45. Amartya Sen, World Bank Legal Conference on Comprehensive Legal
and Judicial Development, What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the
Development Process?, Washington, D.C., June 5, 2000, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/legalandjudic
ial.pdf, quoted in Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the 'Rule of Law"
Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 265. Or as David Kennedy explains,
summarizing the shift in thinking that Sen's arguments helped to propel:
'Increasingly, law-understood as a combination of human rights, courts,
property rights, formalization of entitlements, prosecution of corruption, and
public order-came to define development." Kennedy, supra note 11, at 157.
46. Peter Fitzpatrick, "The damned word" Culture and Its (In)compatibility
with Law, 1 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. 2, 11 (2005) (quoting TERRY EAGLETON,
THE IDEA OF CULTURE 50 (2000)).
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law and development scholars and practitioners who invoke
its power, culture is imagined to function as an analytic tool
to make law internal to ordinary individuals and to make
individuals capable of bringing their interests, desires, and
consciousness in line with rule-of-law ends. I therefore focus
in the following Part on how the proponents of this strategy
use culture-not as an object of academic study to explain
differences among contexts, 47 or even necessarily as
something that is out there in the world that must be taken
into account 4 8-but rather as a mechanism of enlisting
ordinary individuals to promote, but more specifically to
embody, development understood as the rule of law.
B. The NeoculturalInterventionist Project
Perhaps the most important contemporary innovator of
what I have termed the neocultural interventionist project
is Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks. In 2003, building on what I will
now shorthand as the failed law reform thesis, Brooks
argued that the standard menu of rule-of-law assistance"'reforming institutions,"' "'rewriting laws,"' 'upgrading the
legal profession through support for stronger bar
associations and law schools,"' and 'increasing legal access
and advocacy"'-predictably fails to produce its intended
effects. 49 The reason why, she offered, rests on the failure of
47. Of course, there is that too. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht et al., Culture Rules:
The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J.
COMP. ECON. 659 (2007) (presenting empirical evidence to argue that cultural
difference among nations accounts for significant variation in the adoption of
rule-of-law norms); Amanda J. Perry, The Relationship Between Legal Systems
and Economic Development: IntegratingEconomic and CulturalApproaches, 29
J.L. & SoCy 282, 286-87 (2002) (arguing that variations in cultural values may
confound prescriptions for legal reform that emphasize the market rather than
the state in allocating economic resources and that emphasize formal legal rules
rather than discretionary standards in establishing the procedures for
legislating and enforcing law).
48. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JuDICIAL REFORM 16
(2004) ('Wholesale importation of foreign laws cannot take root when the laws
are alien to the culture and values of the people.").
49. Brooks, supra note 3, at 2284-85 (quoting the "Rule-of-Law Assistance
Standard Menu" in CAROTHERS, supra note 1, at 168); see also Conceiving a Just
World Under Law: A Panel Summary, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 125, 126-29
(2004) (recording remarks by Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks at the Ninety-Eighth
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 31-Apr. 2,
2004)).
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the rule-of-law aid community to attend to the relation
between law and culture:
[C]reating the rule of law is most fundamentally an issue of norm
creation. The rule of law is not something that exists "beyond
culture" and that can be somehow added to an existing culture by
the simple expedient of creating formal structures and rewriting
constitutions and statutes. In its substantive sense, the rule of law
is a culture, yet the human-rights-law and foreign-policy
communities know very little-and manifest little curiosity-about
the complex
processes by which cultures are created and
50
changed.

Brooks' overarching argument is rooted in the premise
that law and culture are mutually constitutive. Think about
law without also thinking about culture-precisely the
mistake that second-wave rule-of-law promoters were
making-and law is unlikely to work as it should: "rule-oflaw promotion efforts have been disappointing in large part
because they don't take enough account of norms and
culture." 51 To illustrate the point, Brooks described how, in
1999, the UN Mission in Kosovo expediently reinstated
Serb-promulgated law, subject to the proviso that 52
it
complied with international human rights standards.
Brooks reports that even though the contents of these laws
were "decent," the Mission's protracted unwillingness to
accommodate Albanian opposition to Serb-promulgated law,
combined with the Mission's ultimate reversal of its choiceof-law decision, diminished ordinary Albanians' perception
of the legitimacy, and hence the value of following, Missioninstilled law. 53 "This is a small example," Brooks writes, "of
how an overly formalistic approach to law foundered when
it came up against
certain 'irrational' but powerful cultural
54
understandings.
Simply put, Brooks' claim is that law cannot work

50. Brooks, supra note 3, at 2285. Brooks defines culture as "the widely
shared myths, assumptions, behavioral patterns, customs, rituals, and social
and historical understandings of a group." She defines norms as "widely shared
attitudes and their associated behavioral imperatives." Id. at 2286 n.50.
51. Id. at 2322.
52. Id. at 2291-93.
53. Id. at 2293.
54. Id.
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without a cultural precondition-namely, a large number of
people who believe in its value. This argument revives
Lawrence Friedman's intervention in first-wave law and
development scholarship. In 1969, Friedman argued,
against a functionalist definition of modern law, that the
critical distinction between traditional law and its modern
counterpart was a "cultural distinction" made evident
through a popular belief in law's rationality.5 5 Not that
modern law really is rational-it is not, Friedman arguedbut rather that modern legal subjects believe that law is,
should be, and can be rationally calculated to achieve
knowable ends. 56 According to Friedman, modernity and
modern law are, in no small part, a state of mind. Brooks
sounds like (a latter-day) Friedman when she asserts that
"when people already believe law matters, it will matter;
when people think law doesn't matter, it never can." 57
To persuade people to believe that law matters, Brooks
emphasizes practical questions of technique: 58 "How do you
change norms effectively?" 59 What
methods
(e.g.,
interventions in "nonlegal myths and stories, customs and
rituals, habits and assumptions, and patterns of
interaction") should the practitioner use?60 When should the
practitioner focus on elites versus the grassroots? 6 1 This
emphasis on technique stems from a gap she identifies in
U.S. legal scholarship: there is little exploration or advice,
55. Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 11,
27, 29 (1969).
56. Friedman writes:
It is not clear that modern law, as a whole, is more rational in this
sense than ancient law .... [But] the basis of legitimacy-a cultural
fact-has changed. People of the modern world look upon law as a tool,
an instrument, not as an object of tradition or sentiment, as sacred, as
an end in itself, or as a direct emanation from the Divine.
Id. at 29-30.
57. Brooks, supranote 3, at 2301.
58. Brooks suggests that the question of "what precisely are the norms that
underlie a substantive commitment to the rule of law, and that can thus enable
formal law to be an effective mechanism for further cultural change and
adaptation" is "primarily a question for the philosophers among us." Id. at 2323,
2324.
59. Id. at 2328.
60. Id. at 2324, 2338.
61. Id. at 2324.
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she suggests, on the prescriptive "question of how purposive
governmental or nongovernmental
norm-creation projects
'62
might actually work.
In a 2006 book, Can Might Make Rights?: Building the
Rule of Law After Military Interventions, co-authored with
Jane Stromseth and David Wippman, Brooks ventures a set
of working prescriptions for "foreign policy, military, and
humanitarian professionals" in post-conflict settings "to
create a rule of law culture, one in which a reasonably large
percentage of people come to believe in the value of legal
institutions."63 Because the "rule of law is as much a culture
as a set of institutions, as much a matter of the habits,
commitments, and beliefs of ordinary people as of legal
codes," 64 Brooks and her coauthors argue that rule-of-law
practitioners
should aspire to create "substantive
65
commitment[s] to the values underlying the rule of law."
These values include substantive ideals such as respect for
minority and women's rights as well as procedural ideals
such as respect for "the orderly and nonviolent resolution of
disputes and a willingness to be bound by the outcome of
legal rules and processes. ' 66 In this sense, Stromseth,
Wippman, and Brooks argue that a project of changing
individual consciousness-that is, "[p]ersuading people to
believe in the rule of law"-underlies law in any of its
substantive or procedural manifestations. 67

62. Id. at 2325.
63. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN, & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 17, 311 (emphasis

added).
64. Id. at 310.
65. Id. at 15.
66. Id. at 75.
67. Id. at 311. In a later article, Stromseth summarizes the point as follows:
Especially important is the need to focus on the perceptions of ordinary
citizens and to strengthen cultural commitments to the very idea of the
rule of law.... Although institutions and codes are an important part
of the picture, for the rule of law to exist, people must also believe in
the value and efficacy of legal institutions as a means of resolving
disputes. . . . Getting people to believe in the rule of law is very
complex .... [I]t . . . involves grappling with complex issues of how
cultures change and creating rule of law programs that foster cultural
change.
Stromseth, supra note 3, at 1450-51 (2008) (citations omitted) (describing
STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 179, 310-11). See also Jane
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To that end, they propose interventions that are local in
scale and aim to "reach rural citizens, the poor, the
disempowered, and the disaffected" to spread legal
information, skills, and values. 68 For example, rule-of-law
practitioners could develop "programs that seek to empower
women," which, in turn, "can have spillover effects on
economic development and peace-related initiatives. ' '69 Or
they could support paralegals and mediators who "pressure
for reform," 70 and "empower local reformers to change
traditional norms." 71 "Programs that seek more broadly to
educate nonelites about law, human rights, and
governance," Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks argue, "can
effects on more traditional justice
have significant spillover
'72
sector programs.
Development programs that start with culture thus
allow the development practitioner to gain access to
ordinary individuals' understandings of and engagements
with law; to lead these individuals to change these
understandings and relations; and hence to change law
itself. Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks thus offer a
powerful bottom-up imaginary: an idea that national
transformations can reflect local ones and that individual
actors are themselves capable of generating norms and
potentially also "responsible for the spread and dispersal of
these [norms] through their ongoing practices and
activities. ' 73 And they offer a market metaphor to explain
Stromseth, StrengtheningDemand for the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies,
18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 415 (2009).
68. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN, & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 315-16 (emphasis

omitted).
69. Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted).
70. Id. at 339.
71. Id. at 337.
72. Id. at 341 (emphasis omitted). More generally, they propose development
projects that include strengthening supportive civil society institutions, shoring
up legal education, linking formal legal institutions to customary dispute
resolution practices, transferring law-related skills to non-lawyers such as
paralegals and trained mediators, offering conflict resolution services such as
mediation as an alternative to formal dispute resolution institutions, targeting
younger generations, women, and minorities, and linking rule-of-law projects to
other development projects such as agrarian reform or micro-finance. See id. at
330-45.

73. Grdinne de Bdrca, EU Race DiscriminationLaw: A Hybrid Model?, in
LAw AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 97, 98 (Grdinne de Bfirca &

532

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

how a bottom-up trajectory could unfold: they suggest that
legal institutions are beholden and responsive to the
preferences and demands of individual consumers. "With
citizens more aware of their rights and options," they write,
"traditional authorities may face greater incentives to offer
reasonable dispute settlement arrangements if they wish to
continue to attract customers for their services. '74
Lan Cao offers a strikingly similar account of culture,
this time tethered more to the end of economic development
than of the rule of law. Cao's argument is blunt and
straightforward: law and development practitioners should
"pursue the objective of purposive culture change. ' 75 Like
Brooks, Cao begins with the failed law reform thesis and
criticizes the law and development movement for having

Joanne Scott eds., 2006). De Bfirca uses this language to describe an
experimentalist model of governance within legal scholarship that increasingly
aims to recast governance as a set of collaborative problem-solving processes
rather than a specific set of institutions, just as Stromseth, Wippman, and
Brooks seek to recast law as local and evolving relations among public, civil
society, and private actors rather than simply rules and institutions. Although
for the most part scholars in law and development and scholars in the emergent
field of new governance do not overlap, there is clear cross-fertilization of ideas.
For example, Thomas McInerney, supra note 38, at 129-32, draws on new
governance literature to propose that law and development practitioners should
design hybrid public-private problem-solving processes that encourage direct
citizen participation. See also Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C6sar A.
Rodriguez-Garavito, Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic
Globalization, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A
COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 1, 5-6 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C6sar A.
Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005) ("The governance perspective echoes the U.S.
legal realists' and social pragmatists' concern with social engineering that
inspired the first generation of law and development scholars and practitioners
in the 1960s.').
74. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 339-40; see also
Stromseth, supra note 67, at 421 ("By empowering people to know about their
alternatives, not only does this give them more choices, but also it puts a
certain amount of creative pressure on the traditional dispute settlement
system because all of sudden the tribal chiefs know that they are in competition
for market share in dispute resolution. Maybe they need to offer a higher
quality of justice if they want a continued flow of business.").
75. Cao, supra note 3, at 358. Cao also explores links between culture and
economic development in Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and
Development, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1044 (2004) (reviewing AMY CHUA, WORLD ON
FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMoCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND
GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003)), and Lan Cao, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 901,
904 (2007) [hereinafter Cao, Book Review] (reviewing STROMSETH, WIPPMAN &
BROOKS, supra note 3).
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been "focused almost exclusively on the formal aspects of
law, on codes and legislation and courts. It has neglected
the less quantifiable, though crucial, task of changing
habits, mindsets, traditional ideas, or what I call
culture."76 Consider the following passage:
I propose that law and development move beyond law and the
technical dimensions of the "rule of law."

. .

. I argue that we must

enter the cultural milieu and ask whether certain cultural
attributes in a given society are an impediment to that society's
economic development. Law may still be relevant, but only if it is
also viewed culturally, and not just instrumentally, "as the
embodiment of norms ...

and the repository of social meanings." If

law embodies or reflects norms, then norms must accordingly be
addressed, 77especially those that may be at odds with development
objectives.

Like Brooks, Cao advocates a shift from law to culture:
from law as an acultural and instrumental technique to law
as an intrinsic product of culture ("the repository of social
meaning") as well as from law as an instrumental technique
to culture as an instrumental technique of its own. In weak
states, Cao argues, law cannot itself promote social change:
Although law does have an expressive function and thus certain
laws make certain statements which could in turn influence social
norms, this capacity to affect preferences and beliefs through law
is questionable in countries where the rule of law is itself weak.
For those countries, law is insufficient and culture change will be
78
needed.

76. Cao, supra note 3, at 369, 411. Cao defines culture as the "beliefs,
preferences, and behaviors of [a community's] members, along with the
mechanisms that link these traits to one another"' and "the way in which
groups distinguish themselves from other groups' through 'shared histories,
traditions, values, and beliefs."' Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). And, like Brooks,
Cao begins with Carothers' "Rule-of-Law Assistance Standard Menu." Id. at
369. This "formalistic approach emphasizing rule of law and market
development," she argues, pays insufficient attention "to the non-law
framework, norms, and culture that influence the efficacy of formal laws." Id. at
370.
77. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 360-61. Brooks makes similar points. For example, she writes: "In
the U.S., for instance, where we basically share a substantive normative
commitment to the rule of law, changes in formal law certainly affect our
behavior, generally (although not always) in ways that are possible to predict."
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If law in weak states transcends the norms and values
of the individual culture-bearers it is meant to regulate and
reproduce, culture, by contrast, is particular, local, and
locatable within the beliefs, attitudes, and practices of
ordinary people and domestic social structures. Cao's
examples of culture thus span:
specific practices: India's caste system and the preferences of many
generations of high caste Indians for economic and social
segregation; restrictions on education for girls in many poor
countries; the prohibition on charging interest because it is an
essential part of the "Islamic way of life"; personalistic and groupfocused relationships as well as patterns of authority that
discourage individual wealth accumulation, especially by those not
from the traditional ruling elites. . . . [and] general inclinations,
values, preferences or mindsets that do not contribute positively
towards economic development. Examples include views about
authority and dominance, status as an inherited rather than
acquired attribute; the relationship between the collective and
the
79
individual; superstitions and the tendency to exalt the past.

Because culture--or, here, the values, mindsets, and
behaviors of individuals-is "dynamic and heterogeneous"80
not "stable or inert,"'' l Cao argues culture change projects
are both legitimate and plausible. "Cultures have always
changed," she writes, "culture is not 'independent,
unchanging and unchangeable" and "is all the more
'nonhomogeneous, nonstatic, and interactive' in today's
globalized world. '8 2
Ultimately, Cao appears most concerned with the ways
in which individual self-perceptions can limit people's social
and material readiness to participate in market activity.
For example, she draws on literature that "demonstrates
how an individual's understanding of his or her own self,
which is in turn tied to his or her socially constructed being
as a 'Hindu,' an 'untouchable,' determines access to
Brooks, supra note 3, at 2299. And "although social norms are tightly linked to
law in some societies, they are not at all linked in others. When they are
delinked, changing the law will have little effect; only an explicit focus on norm
creation is likely to lead to the possibility of the rule of law." Id. at 2323.
79. Cao, supra note 3, at 358-59.
80. Id. at 398.
81. Id. at 397.
82. Id. at 394-95 (footnotes omitted).
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education, trading group, and social network. '8 3 An
individual's understanding of herself is also tied to other
"internal constraints," such as insufficient demand by girls
for their own education.8 4 As for elites, "one could ask," Cao
proposes, "if certain values and attitudes may be an
obstacle to economic progress and whether [they]
subscribe to such values and attitudes. ' 5
Like other neocultural interventionist scholars, Cao
aims to identify and change self and social understandings
that impede development. "[Imnterveners will draft the
necessary laws, construct the necessary institutions .... Yet
history and experience have shown that such measures are
not sufficient .... New norms [will] have to be inculcated...
• Yet how does one go about doing this? '8 6 As a possible
model for change, Cao proposes projects like the Grameen
Bank which requires, as a condition of lending, that debtors
recite specific promises (e.g., to use pit latrines, educate
their children, spend appropriately on weddings).8 7 Similar
to the more general educational and empowerment projects
proffered by Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Cao's
prescriptions are about enabling people to comprehend
their attitudes and values about law and development
differently.
Thus if Riles divides the world of legal scholars into
"culturalists" who "generally treat law as the embodiment
of norms . . .and the repository of social meanings" and
"instrumentalists" who "view law in primarily pragmatic
instrumental terms, as a tool to be judged by its successes
or failures in achieving stated ends," then the scholars I
describe here position themselves as a self-conscious
amalgam of the two: cultural instrumentalists, so to

83. Id. at 387.

84. Id. at 388.
85. Id. at 390.
86. Cao, Book Review, supra note 75, at 904.
87. Cao, supra note 3, at 410-11. See generally The Sixteen Decisions of
Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org ("16 Decisions" hyperlink located
under "Quick Links ' ) (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). For sobering data on some of
the effects (or lack thereof) of this social conditioning and its link to market
participation, see Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the
West has Misperceived the Grameen Bank's Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 217, 259 (2005).
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speak.88 And they reject the thesis that law transcends the
society it governs: they instead borrow from the legal
anthropologist the claims that law is a cultural
phenomenon and that it can be analyzed by observing the
ways in which ordinary people understand and experience
legal ideas and institutions.8 9 And they are transforming
these claims into policy tools. These tools treat culture-or,
more accurately, the individuals envisioned to embody itas capable of and responsible for transforming law from an
empty and autonomous set of forms into an overarching,
meaningful, and relevant social field. In other words, if law
depends on culture for meaning, then the policy of creating
new law would seem to require the policy of creating new
cultural meanings as well.
To be sure, none of these scholars propose that culture
change is a silver bullet, easy to achieve, or alone sufficient
to pursue the ends of law and development. But all agree
that it is a promising, even necessary, component of a ruleof-law development plan. For Brooks, engaging in purposive
culture change projects is a moral imperative insofar as
these efforts stand to alleviate involuntary suffering.90
Thus, her aim is to enable interveners to carry out these
projects as "self-consciously and effectively as possible."9 1
Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks likewise write, "The task
of creating rule of law cultures requires interveners to enter

88. Riles, supra note 15, at 973-74; cf. Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human
Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage, 108 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 52 (2006) (describing the ways in which legal knowledge
instrumentalizes all of its encounters, including those with culture, in its wake).
89. For example, Susan Silbey explains that "cultural analyses of law
attempt to describe the processes by which law contributes to the articulation of
meanings and values in daily life." Susan S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural
Analyses of Law, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 42 (1992). For an overview of
multidisciplinary contributions to the cultural study of law, see generally
Austin D. Sarat, Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 129 (2000) (reviewing PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999)). See also CULTURAL ANALYSIS,
CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE LAW (Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds., 2003);
PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (1999); LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (Austin Sarat & Thomas

R. Kearns eds., 1998); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35
(2001).

90. Brooks, supra note 3, at 2321-22.
91. Id. at 2340.
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into largely uncharted territory, but it is territory that can't
be neglected. '92 For Cao, "A culture change project should
be considered if certain 93cultural attributes are 'harmful to
economic productivity."'
It is still too early to assess the actual effects of this
renewed turn to culture. But its adoption in law review
articles, 94 and actual development policy has been swift and
broadspread. In 2004, one commentator noted that "[topdown, formulaic and sector-specific reforms have, in some
international aid circles, been supplemented or even
replaced with longer-term, grassroots initiatives that seek
to promote the development of a 'rule of law culture."' 95 A
stunning example of how legal scholarship can diffuse into
practice, a 2007 USAID-funded project report opens with
the words of Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks: 'Promoting
the Rule of Law involves... changing culture as much as it

92. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 314.
93. Cao, supra note 3, at 384.
94. Erika R. George, After Atrocity Examples from Africa: The Right to
Education and the Role of Law in Restoration, Recovery, and Accountability, 5
LOy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 59, 77, 84-85 (2007) (arguing that "lawyers and policy
makers involved in transitional justice initiatives should see themselves as
tasked with the challenge of creating the conditions necessary for the growth of
a rule of law culture," which "is a long-term project, especially in societies where
a skepticism of law may need to be unlearned before a more constructive role
for law in society can flourish"); John C. Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 468, 472-73 (2003) (calling for "strategies
to export values, not statutes" among legal elites and to create a "rule of law
culture" among "the mass public," by stimulating "a bottom up demand for the
rule of law"); David Tolbert with Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and
Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 29,
55 (2006) (arguing that "[iln addition to rebuilding the institutions of modern
justice systems, [rule-of-law assistance programs] can also be instrumental in
fostering the values and attitudes that make up a 'rule of law culture' within a
society, and in creating a demand for the rule of law at the political and
grassroots levels"); Varda Hussain, Note, Sustaining JudicialRescues: The Role
of Outreach and Capacity-BuildingEfforts in War Crimes Tribunals, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. 547, 550 (2005) (arguing that the international community should link
"the establishment of tribunals [with] building a rule of law culture'). In
November 2008, the Minnesota Journal of International Law sponsored a
symposium focused "on the broad theme of creating a global rule of law culture."
See Creating a Global Rule of Law Culture, http://www.law.umn.edu/mjil/2008symposium.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
95. Elisabetta Baviera, A Closer Look at the Rule of Law (2004),
http://www.lawanddevelopment.org/articles/ruleoflawpaper.html
(last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
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does creating new institutions ... Without a widely shared
cultural commitment to the idea of the Rule of Law, courts
are just buildings, judges just public employees, and
constitutions just pieces of paper."' 96 Another USAIDfunded report calls building "a rule of law culture" a first
order priority in post-transition Cuba. 97 The American Bar
Association now lists "building a 'rule of law culture"'
through programs of popular education among its core
areas of development assistance-in between "combating
corruption" and "revising procedural and substantive
criminal codes. 98s A 2007 policy paper published by an
Australian institute calls on the U.N. to create "rule of law
cultures" through its peacekeeping efforts.9 9 That same
year, the RAND Corporation included a section on
"Establishing a Rule-of-Law Culture" in The Beginner's
Guide for Nation-Building, to enable legal practitioners to
move beyond a standard set of technical institutional
reforms associated with building the rule of law. 00
96. ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE & FREEDOM HOUSE, INC., RULE OF LAW IN
TIMOR-LESTE 2 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting JAMES DOBBINS, SETH G.
JONES, KEITH CRANE

&

BETH COLE DEGRASSE, THE BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO

NATION-BUILDING 88 (2007)). Dobbins, Jones, Crane, and DeGrasse appear to
take this language from STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 75-76.
97. LAURA PATALLO SANCHEZ, ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN CUBA 7

available at http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/ResearchStudies/LPatallo
SanchezRuleofLaw.pdf.
and
Eurasia,
Rule
of
Law
Initiative-Europe
98. ABA
http://www.abanet.org/rol/europe-andeurasia (last visited Mar. 31. 2009); see
also Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Rule of Law ProgramsHave Global Impact, ARK. LAW.,
Oct. 2006 at 14, 16 ("The international programs of the ABA have developed a
wide array of programming to assist in reforming the legal education systems in
our host countries and to foster a more robust rule of law culture through legal
literacy initiatives").
99. Jeremy Farrall, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law 8
(Austl. Nat'l Univ. Ctr. for Int'l Governance & Justice, Issues Paper No. 1 2007);
see also Norman Henry Pentelovitch, Seeing Justice Done: The Importance of
Prioritizing Outreach Efforts at International Criminal Tribunals, 39 GEO. J.
(2003),

INT'L L. 445, 484 (2008) (describing how efforts to create the Special Court of

Sierra Leone included "numerous initiatives targeted at building a rule of law
culture through outreach" to local communities).
100. DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 96, at 87-91. They write: "[F]or rule of law to
exist, the law's 'consumers'-ordinary people-need to be convinced of the value
of legal institutions and educated in what it can do." Id. at 90. There is also
'"The Culture of Lawfulness Project," a U.S.-based NGO that creates educational
initiatives "to enhance societal involvement in supporting the rule of law" in
various countries. See Welcome to the Culture of Lawfulness,
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Thus, at what may become the inception of a new shift
within law and development practice-from building the
rule of law to building rule of law cultures- the time may
be right to question the concept of culture being taken for
granted. Translating the turn to culture into practice, and
dealing with real people in actual cultural situations, may
produce surprises that reveal the limits of neocultural
interventionists' conceptualizations not only of culture but
also of law.
II. MAKING SENSE OF CULTURE AS AN ANALYTIC TOOL OF LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT

The remainder of this Article responds directly to the
call of neocultural interventionist scholars to consider how
culture change-that is, changing people as a means of
promoting law and development-might actually work. To
that end, I begin by examining how the concept of culture
becomes configured when it is deployed as a means of
entrenching law. Within its disciplinary home in
anthropology, culture refers most generally to complex
intersections of human agency and social structure. 101 For
example, anthropologists John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff
describe culture as "the semantic ground on which human
beings seek to construct and represent themselves and
others-and, hence, society and history."'102 When scholars
configure culture as a tool of representation in this way,
then, as Don Mitchell cautions, they cannot "draw on
culture itself as a source of explanation; rather culture is
always something to be explained as it is socially produced
through myriad struggles over and in spaces, scales, and

http://www.cultureoflawfulness.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
101. For a pithy history of the concept of culture within anthropology that
summarizes multiple and competing definitions, see KEVIN AvRUCH, CULTURE &
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 5-16 (1998).

102. They write further:
As this suggests, [culture] is not merely a pot of messages, a repertoire
of signs to be flashed across a neutral mental screen. It has form as
well as content; is born in action as well as thought; is a product of
human creativity as well as mimesis; and, above all, is empowered.
JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN COMAROFF, 1 OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION:
CHRISTIANITY, COLONIALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 21-22 (1991),
quoted in RANKIN, supra note 41, at 47.
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landscapes. . . . '[Clulture' is always and everywhere
inextricably related to social, political, and economic forces
03
and practices."1
Neocultural interventionists, however, aim to use
culture to achieve particular policy ends and hence they
cast culture in a far more specific form. They first configure
culture as a mental domain, or rather as a bundle of
conscious values and beliefs possessed by individuals. I call
this culture as consciousness. Thus, for example, in
neocultural interventionist paradigms, a development
practitioner can intelligibly ask whether an individual "has"
a suitable cultural relation to law. As we have seen, one has
such a suitable relation when one believes in, values, or
simply wants the kind of social existence that the rule of
law envisions. I do not challenge this conceptualization of
culture on its own terms. Rather, I seek to examine,
through ethnographic exploration in the Part that follows,
how it produces particular kinds of programmatic
knowledge about development beneficiaries, and with what
potential blind spots and limitations. My ethnographic
examples examine how ordinary people, rather than lack
legal consciousness, repeatedly invoke legal ideals precisely
because they cannot depend on legal rules to work as they
should. These professed beliefs in law, I argue, function as
political claims.
Neocultural interventionists, however, also configure
culture as a behavioral domain-and it is here that culture
becomes analogous to law. Both law and culture are
imagined as a set of social rules capable of inducing
behavioral change in a normative and reasonably
predictable direction. I call this culture as lawlike rules. But
this conceptualization of culture is only implicit in the
scholarship I have surveyed and, as such, it requires
careful, if also suggestive, explication. I also set forth what I
see as its conceptual limitations (as a basis of development
interventions) prior to turning to my ethnographic
examples.
Here is how culture comes to resemble law in the
neocultural interventionist project. As a tool of social
change, law promises explicit guidelines for how the world
103. DON MITCHELL, CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(2000) (emphasis omitted), quoted in RANKIN, supra note 41, at 32.
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should be-guidelines that are paradoxically at once
general, autonomous, and acontextual and capable of
actually shaping social behavior in specific contexts in
reasonably enduring and predictable ways. 10 4 The challenge
of exporting law to developing and post-conflict states
resides in social, economic, and political relations that
stubbornly resist the explicit demands of a liberal legal
framework-be they demands for the equal education of
girls, nondiscrimination in access to markets, or neutral
law enforcement. As a result, transplanted law in those
places appears only general, autonomous, and acontextual:
a set of empty forms disconnected from the social contexts
and social behaviors that law is meant to constitute,
regulate, and reproduce.
What neocultural interventionist scholars propose as a
solution rests on the powerful idea that, in certain contexts,
culture maps more closely onto human consciousness and
behavior than does law, and that in those contexts, culture
presents a more reliable guide than law for shaping what
humans want and how they will choose to behave. This is
why neocultural interventionists turn to culture to
admonish rule-of-law practitioners for exporting an
autonomous set of "formal" legal rules. This is also why
they invoke culture in a prescriptive or instrumental form:
to embed those rules in context, and make them powerful
and imbued with meaning.
But as neocultural interventionists deploy culture as a
means of entrenching law, they describe law and culture as
distinct, even oppositional, categories. Recall that in
neocultural interventionist paradigms, transplanted legal
rules and institutions stand outside of culture. 0 5 Culture
by contrast is particular, locatable, and performed within

104. Numerous law and development scholars have noted the paradox of
this promise. See, e.g., Cao, supra note 9, at 552 ("Modern law is to be both
autonomous from social interests and instrumental for the purposes of
establishing certain social interests . . . ."); Trubek, supra note 10, at 5
(proposing that modern law is conceptualized as "relatively autonomous from
other sources of normative order" and as "an instrument through which a
variety of possible social goals may be achieved").
105. See, e.g., STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 76 ('Without
a widely shared cultural commitment to the idea of the rule of law, courts are
just buildings, judges are just bureaucrats, and constitutions are just pieces of
paper.") (emphasis omitted).
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and against legal institutions that are formal and
acultural l0 6 Thus, although neocultural interventionists
aim to denaturalize law-that is, to understand law as
cultural and, therefore, as a particular social phenomenon
that must operate within the cultural logic of a societythese acts of construction renaturalize law and legal
institutions as the formal and acultural outside of a
07
cultural inside.
And strikingly, in their work, as law becomes acultural
in this way, culture begins to look like law. For them,
culture becomes a set of general social rules capable of
producing social behaviors in specific contexts in a
reasonably determinate fashion. Thus, in neocultural
interventionist accounts of culture, we can find positivist
conceptualizations of culture that explain how the world is:
Albanians who seek honor, 108 people who oppose the
education of girls. 10 9 Here, culture is concrete, legible, and
capable of offering highly predictive insight into social
behavior. And we can also find normative and dynamic
conceptualizations of culture. Here, culture is fluid and
open to iteration and change. 110 And, once changed, culture
can ideally provide an alternate set of explicit and
reasonably stable rules for how the world should be in those
contexts where law alone is incapable of wielding similar
regulatory force.
Law's failure to produce its intended effects in weak
states thus becomes a problem of competing normative
orders: one order being law's rules, which are formal,
acultural and indeterminate (or incapable of producing
106. See Gershon & Taylor, supra note 5. See, e.g., supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
107. See Gershon & Taylor, supra note 5. The very project of deploying
"culture" to strengthen 'law" appears practically to compel this sort of
description. Brooks, for example, explicitly distinguishes law in its "formal
sense" from law as "a set of normative commitments," in order to avoid the "risk
[of] assuming what we need to prove." Brooks, supra note 3, at 2306 n.99. Cao
similarly explicitly distinguishes "culture" from "an acultural framework [of]
law and development." Cao, supranote 3, at 370.
108. Brooks, supra note 3, at 2291-92, 2334-35.
109. Cao, supra note 3, at 388-89.
110. See supra notes 80, 81, 82, and surrounding text; see also Brooks, supra
note 3, at 2321 ("[H]uman beings can and do consciously change the cultures in
which they live .... ").
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their intended effects), and the other order being culture's
rules, which are relevant, powerful, and determinate. But
prescriptive efforts to deploy a conceptualization of culture
analogous to the conceptualization of law that law and
development has always desired but thus far has been
unable to achieve-a powerful set of social rules capable of
producing social relations and social order in a reasonably
predictable and determinate fashion"-are likely to
replicate, rather than correct, the disappointing results of
projects of law reform. This is because representations of
culture as lawlike rules, like representations of the rules of
law themselves, are incapable of sustaining a singularly
determinate
or, for that
matter, a consistently
indeterminate form.
Legal and cultural theorist Peter Fitzpatrick explains
that many definitional debates about culture split along the
following lines: culture is claimed to be determinate, reified,
and stable or foundationally indeterminate, dynamic, and
riddled with fissures and internal dissent.1 1 2 Fitzpatrick,
however, reasons that "[d]espite the seeming opposition
between these [two dimensions], culture has to be in a
sense both. '113 He is moved to this conclusion by the myriad
ways in which people interact with their own and other
"cultures," producing both consistency and change. 114 He
argues that "[c]ulture cannot exist as either of its two
dimensions. It cannot endure as determinate invariance, as
stasis, yet if it were merely responsive, it would dissipate
entirely." 115 Fitzpatrick therefore proposes that we think of
culture as a conceptual relation between two opposite states
of being: a "positioned" and "determinately enduring
existence," on the one hand, and an "attentiveness and
attunement to what is ever beyond its determinate
existence," on the other hand.11 6 If culture simply

111. See, e.g., Rittich, supra note 32, at 939 ("In the discourse
development, law is presented over and over again as determinate and stable ...
112. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 46, at 4.

of

113. Peter Fitzpatrick, Costs of Culture 1 (unpublished paper prepared for
the Law and Society Annual Meeting, Humboldt University, Berlin (July 28,
2007)) (on file with author).

114. Id. at 1-2.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id. Bourdieu offers us a similar conceptualization of culture by way of
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represented fixity, it could never be transformed in
response to new people, new ideas, or changing material
structures; if culture simply represented responsiveness or
flux, then it would cease to exist at all.
Fitzpatrick self-consciously represents culture precisely
the way our neocultural interventionists do, only they are
more covert and strategic: for them, culture is sometimes
determinate and sometimes indeterminate and responsive.
Neocultural interventionists invoke culture as a means to
explain actors' behavior in relation to law (for example, why
some people follow law when others do not). When they do
so, they represent culture as a set of social rules that are
entrenched and stable. But they also propose to act upon
local culture to change it, and justify this program by
invoking the idea that culture is dynamic and iterative and
therefore subject to the forces of development and change.
Culture thus emerges as a set of social rules that are both
determinative and stable and responsive and flexible. But
whereas Fitzpatrick places culture's determinate and
responsive dimensions into a mutually constituting
relation, neocultural interventionists aim specifically to
contain the determinate dimension of people's "culture" that
are thought to be in conflict with development and the rule
of law. And they aim to do so in ways that leave
development beneficiaries-in Fitzpatrick's terms-"utterly
the term habitus. As sociologist John Thompson explains:
The habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and
react in certain ways .... The dispositions . . .produced thereby are
also structured in the sense that they unavoidably reflect the social
conditions within which they were acquired .... [And] also durable:
they are ingrained in the body . . . operating in a way that is preconscious and hence not readily amenable to conscious reflection and
modification. Finally, the dispositions are generative and transposable
in the sense that they are capable of generating a multiplicity of
practices and perceptions in fields other than those in which they were
originally acquired....

Hence particular practices or perceptions should be seen, not as the
product of the habitus as such, but as the product of the relation
between the habitus, on the one hand, and the specific social contexts or
'fields' [or sites of struggles] within which individuals act, on the other.
John B. Thompson, Editor's Introduction to PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND
SYMBOLIC POWER 1, 12-14 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew
Adamson trans., 1991).
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to
responsive, or more accurately, utterly receptive"
117
alternative yet newly determinate cultural forms.
Consider, for example, how Cao identifies the values
and behaviors that stand in the way of development: "[T]he
preferences of many generations of high caste Indians for
economic and social segregation;

.

.

.

personalistic and

group-focused relationships as well as patterns of authority
that discourage individual wealth accumulation,

. .

.status

as an inherited rather than acquired attribute;
superstitions and the tendency to exalt the past."'118 Having
conceptualized culture as an explicit and reasonably
determinate set of social rules in this way, Cao also argues
that culture is not fixed and static but rather marked by
fissures and heterodox orientations and hence is capable of
transforming itself in responses to stimuli from below and
above. Containing culture's fixed and determinate
dimension in favor of its flexible and responsive one is now
precisely what is needed to make a persuasive case for
change. Thus Cao represents culture-bearers as receptive to
new explicit cultural norms and able to internalize these
norms-be they diffused through pedagogy, media, or
material incentives-as their new implicit, taken-forgranted, and more or less determinate normative reality.
As a matter of empirical speculation, Fitzpatrick doubts
whether interveners can achieve this strategic and stepwise
task.11 9 Here, however, I want to make a more modest
claim. As a point of intervention to change social behavior,
culture, no less than law, represents social norms and
practices of power that signify a present determinate
meaning and a present responsiveness to what lies beyond
that meaning at any given point in time.120 But if we have
moved from changing law to changing law and culture
because the former alone is intractable to reform, then we
should probably ask whether a focus on culture can promote
the ends of law and development in ways that are

117. Fitzpatrick, supra note 113, at 3.
118. Cao, supra note 3, at 358-59.
119. Fitzpatrick, supra note 113 at 2-3; Fitzpatrick, supra note 46, at 10-11.
120. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 113. For Fitzpatrick, the "intrinsic
responsiveness of culture, its attentiveness and attunement to what is ever
beyond its determinate existence, makes impossible the reduction of culture to
what invariably 'is."' Id.
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intrinsically more capable than law of achieving their
planners' particular policy ends. It is true that the "rule of
law is not something that exists 'beyond culture,"' as
neocultural interventionist scholars argue. 121 But deploying
lawlike conceptions of culture as a means of addressing the
indeterminacies and ineffectiveness of failed rule-of-law
projects immediately generates a new set of problemspartly by reviving the old ones in a new form. The
neocultural interventionist project has yet to grapple
directly with the indeterminacies, conflicts, and social
struggles embedded in culture, configured, paradoxically, as
a corrective for "formal" understandings of law.
In the Part that follows, I propose that ethnographic
accounts of local development challenges can enable us to
study and assess the value and limitations of the
contemporary turn to culture. To that end, and in the spirit
of neocultural interventionist calls to develop comparative
case studies, 122 I draw on two suggestive ethnographic
examples from Nepal. In my examples, neocultural
interventionist projects encounter the limitations of both
their conceptualizations of culture, first as consciousness
and second as lawlike rules. The first example reveals
internal tensions in efforts to explain the absence or
presence of the rule of law by invoking the conscious values
and beliefs of ordinary citizens. The second example reveals
similar tensions in efforts to change
individual
consciousness as a means of changing social behavior in a
reasonably determinate fashion. In my examples, we see
individuals who articulate shared desires for social justice
and social order, but who nonetheless enact these desires in
ways that are in tension with the rule of law as understood
in most development accounts. Hence, they suggest the
simultaneous determinacy and responsiveness of constructs
like values and beliefs as they shape social practice. And
most powerfully, they index a profound ambiguity at the
heart of what it means to be a person who is for or against
development and the rule of law.

121. Brooks, supra note 3, at 2285.
122. See, e.g., id. at 2331.
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III. "STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NEPAL

' 123

A. Introduction
With a per capita income of approximately $470 per
year 124 and a geopolitically significant position between the
borders of India and China, Nepal has, for decades, received
donor aid in amounts potentially "disproportionate to its
capacity to absorb and disperse it. ' 125 As Katharine Rankin
and Yogendra Shakya argue, aid assistance there "quickly
became a terrain of ideological conflict-expressing
particularly acute tensions between socialist and capitalist
models of development and, more recently, the ideological
shift from state-led to market-led planning.'' 26 Yet since
the advent of democracy in 1990, all of Nepal's elected
governments have professed ideological commitments to
core tenants of both liberal democracy and neoliberal
economic policy. 27 In fact, during its nine months in power
ending in 1995, even the Communist Party of Nepal
(United Marxist-Leninist) "proposed to institute a Value
Added Tax, privatize public enterprises, liberalize trade to
encourage foreign investment and promote exports, reform
the finance sector, and cut subsidies.' 128 And aid to Nepal
has increasingly involved efforts to promote good
governance and the rule of law in addition to (and likely as
an outgrowth of) neoliberal economic policies. Add to this
mix persistent poverty, a very spotty record on human
rights and economic reform notwithstanding large amounts
of development assistance, a decade-long civil war, and
123. I borrow this title from a USAID grant. See infra note 129.
124. Bureau of S. & Cent. Asian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background
Note: Nepal (Jan. 2009), http:/www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5283.htm.
125. Katharine N. Rankin & Yogendra B. Shakya, Neoliberalizing the
Grassroots? Microfinance and the Politics of Development in Nepal, in NEOLIBERALIZATION: STATES, NETWORKS, PEOPLES 48, 51 (Kim England & Kevin

Ward eds., 2007).
126. Id. at 51-52.
127. Genevieve Lakier, Illiberal Democracy and the Problem of Law: Street
Protest and Democratizationin Multiparty Nepal, in CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN NEPAL 251, 256 (Mahendra Lawoti ed., 2007).
128. RANKIN, supranote 41, at 45.
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sharp social cleavages along gender, caste, and ethnic lines,
and Nepal appears as good a case study as any to explore
some of the possibilities and limitations of a new law and
development technology.
What is more, an unmistakably cultural approach to
promoting law and development has already made its way
into mainstream development discourse there. In 2004,
USAID awarded a three-year contract to a US-based
development organization titled "Strengthened Rule of Law
and Respect for Human Rights.' 1 29 The direction of the
grant likely reflected the goals set forth by USAID/Nepal
for the fiscal years 2003 to 2007 in a 2002 draft report. In a
section entitled "The Development Challenge," the 2002
draft report explains that "Nepalese government managers
generally lack the vision and technical skills to effectively
manage the reform process," and therefore will require
significant donor support. 130 A primary aim of assistance is
therefore to promote "better governance and greater
protection of human rights, [so that] the Nepalese people
will accord more respect to democratic institutions, place
greater value on their democratic freedoms, more readily
defend encroachment upon their democratic rights, and
hold public officials and the institutions they serve more
accountable for their actions."'131 Note the report's diagnosis
of those who govern as lacking vision (in addition to
technical skill) to manage democratic reform, and its
diagnosis of those who stand governed as lacking a
democratic consciousness sufficiently robust to compel the
state to live up to its demands. The report thus envisions

129. See, e.g., ARD, INC., STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NEPAL: ANNUAL REPORT, 1 OCTOBER 2004 THROUGH 30

SEPTEMBER 2005 (Oct. 31, 2005), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PDACJ884.pdf. I
should disclose that I helped prepare a part of the U.S.-based development
organization's response to USAID's request for proposals.
130. USAID/Nepal, "DG Next Steps" Concept Paper, 2003-2007 at 7 (Draft
Version of Nov. 19, 2002) (on file with author). In an effort to confirm the status
of this draft report, I spoke with Julie Werbel, Democracy Specialist at USAID.
She was only able to inform me that in the intervening years, USAID/Nepal
recommended several changes to its long-term democracy and governance
strategy and that, therefore, the goals set forth in the 2002 draft report may or
may not be part of USAID/Nepal's newer approach. Telephone Interview with
Julie Werbel, Democracy Specialist, USAID, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 20,
2006).
131. Id. at 8.
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Nepali people, both within the state and in the general
population, whose vision and consciousness are enabled and
constrained by normative forces other than the rule of law.
In line with an emphasis on enabling ordinary people to
respect, value, and defend democracy and human rights,
one of the first projects administered pursuant to the new
USAID grant was a poll of a large cross-section of ordinary
citizens about how they in fact understood their human and
legal rights. 132 The poll, published in 2006, reports that
"approximately forty-six percent of the 3,045 sample
respondents were found to be familiar with fundamental
rights endorsed by the Nepalese Constitution .... [But] a
large majority (ninety-four) of respondents [and eighty-five
percent of illiterate respondents] believe that violations of
human rights were taking place in the country."'13 3 That
human rights violations were taking place in Nepal is an
assertion hardly in need of support. The events of the recent
past included both a Maoist insurgency and, in 2005, a
military coup during which the King declared emergency
rule, suspending many fundamental rights in an effort to
crush the insurgency. 134 Over 13,000 people, many of them
civilians, have been killed by the conflict 135 and both the
Maoists and the government have been accused of serious
human rights violations. 136 During the period of emergency
rule, Nepal's independent press functioned under severe
censorship; political activists, political party leaders, and
student leaders were routinely arrested without adequate
warrant; and human rights activists fled the country or
went into hiding. And Nepal had, by many accounts, one
of
37
the highest rates of disappeared persons in the world.
132. ARD, INC., RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: OPINION POLL (2006),
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PNADJ623.pdf.
133. Id. at 17.
134. For background on the insurgency, see Arjun Karki & David Seddon,
The People's War in Historical Context, in THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL 3 (Arjun
Karki & David Seddon eds., 2003).
135. Nepalese Monarchy to be Abolished, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/southasia/7158670.stm.

Dec. 24, 2007,

136. For a detailed report of human rights abuses by state agents and
Maoists insurgents, see AMNESTY INT'L, NEPAL: A SPIRALLING HUMAN RIGHTS
CRISIS (2002), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA31/016/2002/en/dom.
ASA310162002en.pdf.
137. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2005, at 304 (2005),
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What I was unable to find, however, was evidence of
how the social fact captured in the opinion poll just citedpeople certain that rights are being violated even as they
are unable or unwilling to articulate precisely what those
rights are-shaped USAID's approach to strengthening the
rule of law and respect for human rights. I have read all the
documents I could obtain produced in the expenditure of
this grant-work plans, trip reports, annual reports, etc.and they display some puzzling lacunae. 13s They contain no
evidence of programmatic efforts to recruit existing Nepali
consciousness of human rights violations, despite the
opinion poll that shows it is very salient. 139 Nor was there
any visible connection between USAID's overarching
goals-to induce Nepali people to place greater value on
their democratic freedoms, to hold their government
accountable, and to defend against encroachment upon
their rights-and the existing array of social movements
mobilizing against these very deficits in Nepali political and
social life.
In Nepal, struggles for various democratic development
ideals, such as de-centralized land markets, women's
property rights, and the eradication of domestic violence
and indentured servitude, are waged on multiple, disparate,
and often competing terrains. For example, during the
People's War, Maoists campaigned aggressively for land
available at http://hrw.org/wr2k5/wr2005.pdf; Charles Haviland, UN Torture
Expert in Nepal Visit, BBC NEWS, Sept. 10, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south_asia/4232058.stm.
138. See U.S. Agency Int'l Dev., Development Experience Clearinghouse,
http://dec.usaid.gov/ (Select "PDF Full Text Search," then "Rule of Law/Human
Rights," and "Nepal").
139. For example, the project's final report only references a lack of popular
knowledge about law. It recounts that people have insufficient information
about legal aid and about their right to receive government services without the
payment of bribes. ARD, INC., NEPAL: STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: FINAL REPORT 6, 24 (Aug. 10, 2007), http://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf docs/PDACK092.pdf. Other reports list citizen knowledge of basic legal
rights as an indicator of an objective to increase access to justice and list
awareness of human rights violations (such as trafficking and torture) as an
indicator of an objective to reduce these crimes. However, I could not find
specific discussion of how these indicators were used in practice to design or
measure programmatic interventions. See, e.g., ARD, INC., STRENGTHENED RULE
OF LAw AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NEPAL: THIRD ANNUAL WORK PLAN, 1
OCTOBER 2006 TO 10 JUNE 2007 4 (Oct. 31 2006), http://pdf.usaid.gov/

pdf docs/PDACJ906.pdf.
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reform, capturing land in poor western regions of the
country. 140 They proposed to "usher in capitalist relations of
production" by redistributing the property of landowners
"who do not put their labour or capital to use on the land"
and by capping the rent and ownership rights of
landowners who lease their land to tenant farmers. 4 1 Calls
for "'serious structural improvements in land tenure"' as a
precondition for a stable democracy and a modern
agricultural economy are supported not only by the
Maoists, but by a range of political actors in Nepal.142 But
as far as I can discover, land reform does not appear to be a
significant mainstream donor priority. 4 3 In contrast to land
reform, however, there have been significant donor-funded
efforts to improve women's property rights to parallel those
of men, yet this is also a domain of ideological struggle.
According to one group of scholars, "[a]lthough property
rights for women are central to the Maoist revolutionary
agenda, mainstream women's groups lobbying for property
rights for women have not considered it desirable to enter
into a dialogue with the All Nepal Women's Association
(Revolutionary) (ANWAR) which is politically affiliated to
140. Mukunda Kattel, Introduction to 'The People's War' and its
Implications,in THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL, supra note 134, at 49, 53.
141. Babu Ram Bhattarai, The PoliticalEconomy of the People's War, in THE
supra note 134, at 117, 158.

PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL,

142. Mohan Mainali, 'Development' vs the Maobaadis, in UNDERSTANDING
THE MAOIST MOVEMENT OF NEPAL 125, 126 (Deepak Thapa ed., 2003) (citation
omitted). See, e.g., Prashant Jha, Land and Peace, NEPALI TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008.
Jha writes:
[A]part from occasional civil society seminars and sporadic op-ed
pieces, the land question isn't on the agenda. It is a complex policy
challenge, affects a majority of the country's population, and has
antagonistic classes pitted against each other. Do we need land reform?
The consensus across the board is yes.
Id. Some Nepali commentators have advocated for the redistribution of land,
"not because the peasants who till the land should own [it]," but rather to
encourage peasants to adopt "better financial and marketing strategy for
improving nationwide productivity." Prakash Bom, Common Minimum
Program of Maoist Nepal for a Consensus Government (Aug. 5, 2008),
http://www.nepalitimes.com.np/issue/2008/08/22fPlainSpeaking/15154.
143. The Community Self Reliance Center, a "movement based" NGO, has
for fifteen years supported land rights for tenant and landless farmers. It
receives support from the following organizations: Action Aid, MS Nepal,
DANIDA, Oxfam, and International Land Coalition. See generally Community
Self Reliance Centre, http://www.csrcnepal.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).

552

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

the Maoist movement." 144 Similarly, although development
agencies have supported women's efforts against the sale
and distribution of alcohol, these efforts are distinct from
the more coercive Maoist women's campaigns against
"liquor capitalists" 145 that have commanded far greater
visibility and effect. 146 As one Nepali scholar writes: "It is a
sad commentary on Nepal's democracy that the liquor lobby
and dubious human rightists are calling for 'talks' on the
alcohol issue only when confronted with the fire and
brimstone of the Maoist women."'147 Here is an anecdotal
description of how these Maoist campaigns unfold:
In Surkhet district the people tell of a Maoist people's court. An
all-women guerilla unit with the area commander came to a
village at 10 p.m. to hold court. On trial was a husband who was
habitually drunk and mercilessly beat his wife. He was warned.
Everyone was told to bring out their bottles of raksi [rice wine],
locally made and purchased. The bottles bought were to be
returned to the shop. The Maoists would warn the shopkeeper.
The home-brewed alcohol was destroyed after keeping some aside
for medicinal and ritualistic purposes. A homily was delivered on
the ill effects of alcohol, and the linkage between alcohol,
immiseration, wife beating and illiteracy explained. After holding
an adult literacy class, they left. 148

Yet, even among Maoists themselves there is internal
dissent about the purposes and effects of these campaigns.
Sujita Shakya, a women's right activist and Maoist
collaborator, writes: "The injustice, tyranny, exploitation
and oppression faced by women cannot be overcome just by
beating someone with
50-100 bamboo sticks and breaking
149
pots of local wine."
144. Shobha Gautam et al., Where There are No Men: Women in the Maoist
Insurgency in Nepal, in UNDERSTANDING THE MAOIST MOVEMENT OF NEPAL,
supra note142, at 93, 105.
145. Saubhagya Shah, The Other. Side of the Alcohol Economy, in
UNDERSTANDING THE MAOIST MOVEMENT OF NEPAL, supra note142, at 133, 134.
146. See, e.g., Tatsuro Fujikura, The Role of Collective Imagination in the
Maoist Conflict in Nepal, 23 J. FOR ASS'N NEPAL & HIMALAYAN STUD. 21, 25-26
(2003).

147. Shah, supra note 145, at 134.

148. Gautam et al, supra note 144, at 107.
149. Sujita Shakya, The Maoist Movement in Nepal: An Analysis from the
Women's Perspective, in THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL, supra note 134, at 375,
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Or consider the struggle of kamaiyas (bonded laborers),
150
which was organized around the pursuit of legal rights,
and which, in distinction to Maoist violence, has been
described as precisely the kind of non-violent social
movement that development agencies in Nepal can and
should (and several, in various ways, did) support. 151 In
July 2000, after levying a series of village and district-level
administrative claims to demand the enforcement of the
minimum wage law, debt cancellation, and government
remuneration, a group of kamaiyas staged a sit-in in the
middle of the road near the parliament building in
Kathmandu. 152 The sit-in, which lead to numerous
government arrests and detentions, combined with the
highly visible local uprisings, resulted in a government
declaration of freedom and promises of rehabilitation in the
form of money and land (promises that today are far from
uniformly implemented). 53 One of the oldest and most
high-profile human rights NGO in Nepal, however,
contested this strategy of civil disobedience on behalf, it
appears, of the rule of law. According to anthropologist
Tatsuro Fujikura, this NGO felt that "comprehensive
legislation for kamaiya liberation and rehabilitation, the

387.
150. See Tatsuro Fujikura, The Bonded Agricultural Labourers' Freedom
Movement in Western Nepal, in 2 SOCIAL DYNAMICS IN NORTHERN SOUTH ASIA:
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NORTH INDIA AND NEPAL 319, 322-26,

354 (Hiroshi Ishii et al. eds., 2007) (describing how the kamaiyas' use of liberal
discourses of freedom and human rights prompted some scholars to claim that
these discourses were "intimately tied with neo-liberal ideology, and hence
[were] not genuinely libratory").
151. The kamaiya movement was organized and mobilized by an NGO
named BASE (Backward Society Education) that owes its strength in part to
the 'legitimacy and resources, including its massive membership and
transnational network of support, that it had built up through its ten years of
work in the field of conventional, mainstream development." Tatsuro Fujikura,
Discourses of Awareness: Notes for a Criticism of Development in Nepal, 6 STUD.
NEPALI HIST. & Soc'y 271, 305-06 (2001) [hereinafter Discourses of Awareness];
see also Tatsuro Fujikura, Emancipation of Kamaiyas: Development, Social
Movement, and Youth Activism in Post-Jana Andolan Nepal, 21 HIMALAYAN
RES. BULL. 29, 31-33 (2001).
152. Fujikura, supra note 150, at 342-47.
153. See id. at 346-48. Fujikura reports that donors have provided
assistance to kamaiyas who were granted official land titles, but that "many
BASE leaders.., have criticized the lack of international organizations that are
willing to work directly on the issue of land rights." Id. at 352.
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kind that they had already drafted, needed to be passed 154
by
the parliament before the liberation process could begin."'
At minimum, what these small examples suggest is
that there remain complex gaps between development
efforts to strengthen respect for law and the range of groups
passionately invoking law's demands, albeit in contentious
and contradictory ways. Strategies range from liberal law
reform projects to activist civil disobedience to radical (and
certainly not always democratic) street protests to a
revolutionary insurgency, all aimed at achieving a range of
individual and group rights with new distributive
entitlements. And law figures as a crucial element: Maoists
propose to restructure landlord-tenant relations; Maoist
women hold court; the kamaiyas cast their class struggle in
juridical terms while their NGO advocates clash over the
sequencing of public protests and legislative reform. Query
whether the lack of rule of law in Nepal is connected to a
lack of belief in law or a lack of normative commitments to
various liberal values underlying the rule of law. Rather
than the absence of legal consciousness, we have vexing
social paradoxes: wild political energy and collective social
struggles are channeled through legal language and legal
forms, and emancipatory desires for law coexist with
intense illegality.
Can we make sense of how-in places marked by
violence and law's routine lack of application-law becomes
an object of desire and passion? Colombian legal scholar
Julieta Lemaitre invokes the phrase "legal fetishism" to
describe a devotion to law that exceeds a rational or
utilitarian calculation of law's benefits in the lives of
ordinary Colombian citizens. She describes activists and
citizens who desire law as a means of imagining alternative
realities--ones that affirm the equality and inviolability of
ordinary individuals even as, or perhaps precisely because,
that promise is so frequently revealed as false by the
violence and inequalities in their lives. 155 Brooks argues
154. Id. at 344.
155. Julieta Lemaitre, Legal Fetishism at Home and Abroad, 3 UNBOUND 6,
12-18 (2007); see also Patrick McAuslan, In the Beginning Was the Law... an
Intellectual Odyssey 77 (unpublished paper presented at Cornell Law School
East Asian Law and Culture Conference Series, Mar. 16, 2004), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cornell/ealccs/pld/2/ (arguing that "there is no part of the
world where the principles of legal liberalism are not [already] relevant, if only
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that in societies organized around the rule of law, law gives
moral meaning to violence and to social organization. 156 But
what these examples suggest is that we have yet to fully
grapple with how law's signifying power-or its
participation in definitional and hence political strugglesis salient not only in places where the rule of law works
well (in a utilitarian/functional
sense), but also,
paradoxically, in places where it doesn't.
Theorizing what it would mean to administer
development projects to increase respect for and awareness
of rights among groups of people-who already hold beliefs
and values about law and legal rights and, as the USAID
poll suggests, who are already certain that their rights are
being violated-may be a vastly more contentious and
politicized project than development practitioners imagine
when they propose culture change and legal empowerment.
Many ordinary people already profess many of the kinds of
values and desires that rule-of-law practitioners wish to
instill-desires for egalitarian land markets, sobriety, nonviolence, literacy, and minimum labor standards, but they
do so in a political nexus completely at odds with anything
known to rule-of-law imagery.
By way of more detailed exploration, I offer two
ethnographic accounts of people acting in seemingly nonlaw abiding ways, but because of their commitments to
what we could consider values underlying the rule of law.157
The first account draws on the work of anthropologist
Genevieve Lakier and involves citizens demanding social
order through coercive forms of street protest-specifically,
that the state regulate and administer compensation for
injuries resulting from everyday traffic accidents. The
second account draws on the work of anthropologist Lauren
Leve and involves a group of village women who have lent
their support to armed struggle in order to achieve, as they
say, values such as social justice.
B. Accidents, Protests, and Roads
In Nepal, many functions of a modern bureaucratic
as an emancipatory project").
156. See Brooks, supra note 3, at 2312-14.
157. See id. at 2322."
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state are negotiated through means other than legal
procedure. Allocating the costs of everyday traffic accidents,
for instance, is not up to routine police supervision of
traffic, well-functioning auto insurance, and lawsuits in tort
but instead to endemic, popular road blockades or chakka
jams. An iconic symbol of development, roads were scarce
before Nepal's first democratic revolution in 1951.158 By the
1970s, however, the government (by then reestablished as
an absolute monarchy) devoted significant development
expenditures, heavily subsidized by foreign aid, to
transportation. 159 The goal, it claimed, was to promote
national integration and economic development. 160 But in
addition to promoting the nation and development, the
project of building roads generated many other effects:
weakening of local industries due to an influx of Indian
commodities, 161 increasing fatalities due to traffic
accidents, 162 fierce battles over who holds the "right" to
operate transportation vehicles for profit, and the systemic
163
utilization of roads as an instrument of collective protest.
Consider the following examples, which illustrate how
extralegal and collective negotiations govern life on the
roads in democratic Nepal, and which may appear to
suggest a widespread lack of belief in the rule of law.
Nepal's transportation sector is dominated by a "syndicate"

158. ARAN SCHLOSS, THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT: TRANSPORTATION POLICY
IN NEPAL 13 (1983). In 1951, Nepal had 376 kilometers of roads (of which 290

kilometers were fair-weather). By 1976, that number had increased to 3,200
kilometers.
159. Id.
160. National Planning Commission, The Fourth Five-Year Plan (19701975), ch. 10 at 1-2 (1970) (on file with author).
161. See JAGANNATH ADHIKARI & DAVID SEDDON, POKHARA: BIOGRAPHY OF A

TOWN 86 (2002) (describing how the construction of a road linking the town of
Pokhara to the Indian border weakened industries such as weaving and
metalwork).
162. See, e.g., D.A.C. Maunder & T. Pearce, Bus Accidents in the Kingdom of
Nepal: Attitudes and Causes, 22 INDIAN J. TRANSP. MGMT. 127 (1998); Nilambar
Jha & Chandra Shekhar Agrawal, Epidemiological Study of Road Traffic
Accident Cases: A Study from EasternNepal, 8 REG'L HEALTH FORUM 15 (2004);
Poudel-Tandukar et al., Traffic Fatalitiesin Nepal, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2542
(2004) (research letter).
163. Genevieve Lakier, The Spectacle of Politics: Protest, Violence, and the
Problem of Democracy in Nepal, 1990-2006, at ch. 2, The Highway and the
Chakka Jam (2009) (unpublished dissertation manuscript, on file with author).
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of bus companies, the Federation of Nepali Transport
Entrepreneurs (FNTE), which holds monopoly control over
most long-haul routes throughout the country. 164 In 2003,
in response to a confrontation sparked by private
competition, the FNTE shut down nearly Nepal's entire
highway system-a chakka jam its members enforced for
eleven consecutive days. 165 In negotiations with the
national Ministry of Labor and Transport, the FNTE
demanded that the government deny private transport
companies outside its syndicate access to long-haul
routes166-a
request that contravened both government
67
policy and actual law in favor of market competition.
Although the government refused to change its laws as the
FNTE requested, the FNTE, after lifting the jam,
largely
68
succeeded in securing continued non-enforcement.
This state of affairs persisted despite the fact that a
host of private transport companies vociferously objected to
the government's failure to achieve, as they argued, a more
competitive, efficient, and just transportation sector. 69 For
example, the director of one private bus company told
Lakier:
The government does not help us at all in our efforts [to expand
service to the West]. In the [Transport] Act it is written that one
can conduct service everywhere. Nothing is written against the
right to run buses.... And yet we cannot. Then what is the fate of
1 70
this country [if this rule cannot be applied]?

164. Lakier, supra note 127, at 263-65.
165. Id. at 264-65.
166. Id.; see also Lakier, supranote 163, ch. 2 at 4.
167. The Vehicle and Transport Management Act of 1993 provides for
competition in transportation services. Lakier, supra note 163, ch. 2 at 4-5.
Moreover, in 2001, the national Consumer Protection Council formed under a
1997 Consumer Protection Act officially banned transportation syndicates.
Lakier, supra note 127, at 263.
168. Lakier, supranote 127, at 265.
169. According to Lakier, in 2006 private companies "were still battling to
gain new route permits." Id.; see also Ratnakar Adhikari, Political Economy of
Syndicate System, KATHMANDU POST, July 31, 2008, available at
http://www.sawtee.org/uploads/articles/syndicate.php.
170. Lakier, supra note 163, ch. 2 at 44-45 (quoting Interview with Nirmal
Rai Majhi, Director of Agni Yatayat bus company, in Kathmandu, Nepal (July
8, 2003)).
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The director of another company lamented:
The government cheated us at the Ministry level. At first the
government told us to run the bus service with the assurance that
we could get the route permit. But 45 days have passed-there has
been no change ....
The
problem with Nepal is that there is law
17 1
but no implementation.

If one is inclined to see "culture" in the FNTE's
practices of patronage and defiance, then this story does
little to undercut a cultural explanation of anti-market (and
illegal) behavior, even if it does equally little to reveal what
sort of culture change intervention could capably break up
this monopoly cartel. But what Lakier proceeds to show is
that the extralegal tactics of the chakka jam used by the
FNTE to undermine the state's control over violence and
markets are also used by ordinary people, all the time, to
compel the state to enforce the rule of law, as it were, in
their lives and communities. Consider this newspaper
description of a local chakka jam, that occurred on
December 9, 2003, and which Lakier describes as a regular,
even banal, occurrence:
An accident in Bara district in Bakuliya VDC [village development
community] [occurred] at 10:40 in the morning which killed a
student from ward 10 of the VDC. As soon as the accident
occurred, hundreds of students from the nearby high school closed
down the highway for nearly 2 hours. The police reported that they
did so in order to ensure appropriate justice and renumeration was
handed out. The police then toof 7 he driver of the truck to jail,
promising necessary punishment.

These students blockaded the highway in defiance of
legal order and, seemingly, also in defiance of any
procedural safeguards for the accused driver. But they also
staged this blockade to demand legal order-that is, to
demand that the state administer justice in the wake of
traffic accidents.
Lakier argues that when a traffic accident occurs on
rural roads, particularly in areas with a visible Maoist
171. Id. ch. 2 at 45 (quoting Interview with Surya Man Singh, Director of
Makalu Transportation, in Kathmandu, Nepal (Aug. 24, 2003)).
172. Id. ch. 2 at 23 (quoting the Nepali language national daily, Rajdhani,
Dec. 10, 2003).
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presence, state authorities are often entirely absent.
Villagers blockade the roads not only to prevent the
offending driver from leaving the accident scene, but also to
force the police to show. 173 Lakier, in fact, asserts that the
failure of the police to perform their duties is frequently the
very injury villagers protest. In one case, "angry neighbors
of an 8 year old child killed by a tractor, first vandalized the
vehicle and beat up the driver, and then blockaded the road,
in order to protest the failure of the police to show up at the
accident scene." 174 In another case, citizens blocked a road
to protest the failure of police to respond after they were
informed of a robbery in a nearby store, and only lifted the
blockade when the chief inspector promised to improve law
enforcement in the area. 175 In the wake of traffic accidents,
road blockades also serve as a means to demand welfare
obligations from a host of authorities. Lakier writes that
[i]n one instance . . . the Royal Nepal Army fetched a helicopter
from Kathmandu in order to fly a girl whose arm had been broken
in an accident with an army truck in Sarlahi district to a nearby
hospital. In another incident, the Gorkha International School
offered the brother of a five year old child killed by a school bus
free tuition until his graduation
as a means of ending an almost
17 6
four hour jam of the road.

When the police respond to a chakka jam, they typically
resolve matters "by impounding both the driver and the
vehicle, until money [can] be made available for the family
of the injured or dead."'1 77 And when accidents involve a
vehicle affiliated with the FNTE (as many do),
compensation is forthcoming from the syndicate boss. 78 In
this way, the crowd is "enforcing the principle of
compensation laid down in the Transportation Act. Yet...
in a way that entirely avoid[s] legal procedure even as it
173. Id. ch. 2 at 25.
174. Id. ch. 2 at 24 (citing the Nepali language national daily newspaper,
Spacetime Dainik, Nov. 18, 2003).
175. Id. ch. 2 at 29 (citing the Nepali language daily, Kantipur, May 26,
2002).
176. Id. ch. 2 at 26 (citing the Nepali language daily, Kantipur, May 22,
2002, and the Nepali language daily Rajdhani, Aug. 6, 2002).
177. Id. ch. 2 at 27.
178. Id.
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depend[s] upon and [is] mediated through the figure of the
law, the police officer." 179 Thus, to ensure that they receive
compensation, villagers forcibly close down the roads and
disrupt the flow of goods and services, but they do so in
order to attract the attention of the police. And part of what
they are demanding is that compensation be mediated by
the police, even as they are simultaneously transgressing
law's terms.
These chakka jams therefore are clearly not instances
of order without law, or instances of disorder indifferent to
law as a disciplining social force. 80° Individuals here use
law as an explicit tool of dispute resolution-not only by
demanding compensation as legislated by state code, but by
demanding that compensation be administered by state law
enforcement officials. But although these extralegal
demands are anchored to state law, chakka jams are also
clearly not instances of order that emerge out of law's
shadows, at least in the sense of informal negotiations
shaped by enforceable legal defaults.'l 8 Instead, for many
who invoke their power, chakka jams are a means of
making oneself (and one's associates) visible before the law
in order to demand legal remedies but through methods
that evade formal legal processes.
For the development practitioner, then, chakka jams
are paradoxical forms: ordinary citizens regularly exceed
law via collective mobilization, but to demand law's
application to their harms. 8 2 If the rule of law describes "a

179. Id. ch. 2 at 33. According to Lakier,
Accident insurance-including insurance for third party injuries-had
been required for all drivers and public transport operators since the
passing of the Transportation and Public Transport Act in 1995 ....
Section 163 required all public and private transporters to carry
accident insurance that pays the victim or victim's family up to 10,000
rupees in the case of an injury, and 30,000 rupees in the case of a
death.
Id. ch. 2 at 21, n.28.
180. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).

ORDER WITHOUT LAw:

How

181. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
182. Brooks offers several examples of the complex relations among law,
violence, and order. Yet none quite capture this paradigm. To simplify her more
nuanced illustrations, she explores a peaceable order without state law
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state of affairs in which the state successfully monopolizes
the means of violence, and in which most people, most of
the time, choose to resolve disputes in a manner consistent
with procedurally fair, neutral, and universally applicable
rules, and in a manner that respects fundamental human
rights norms," then development practitioners should see
these practices in tension with the rule of law. 8 3 One
problem, however, is that even if conflict resolution under
the rule of law "depends on the public's confidence and
belief in the very idea of law" people here transgress the
because they believe as much as disbelieve in
law in part 184
law's power.
The FNTE (who, we should recall, commenced a chakka
jam to protest lawful private competition) themselves
complain of the government's failure to enforce formal,
neutral, and predictable legal procedures. One syndicate
boss objected to a lack of state supervision and due process
protections in the aftermath of traffic accidents:
When third parties are in the road and don't see the bus and get
injured.., the government doesn't see what happens and [we are]
forced to provide compensation ....

In India, there is a good

exemplified by Robert Ellickson's cattle ranchers in Shasta County, a violent
order with state law exemplified by Germany under Nazi rule, a violent
"disorder" with state law/law enforcement exemplified by U.S. inner cities, and

a violent order without state law exemplified by Albania in the nineteenth
century and Somalia in the early 1990s. Brooks, supra note 3, at 2306-11.
183. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 78. They write
further that "[i]n the context of today's globally interconnected world, [the rule
of law] requires modern and effective legal institutions and codes, and it also
requires a widely shared cultural and political commitment to the values
underlying these institutions and codes." Id. There are, of course, numerous
scholarly efforts to define the rule of law. For a useful summary of basic
typologies, see Santos, supra note 45, at 256-66 (distinguishing an institutional
or procedural conception of the rule of law from a substantive one and an
instrumental conception of the rule of law from an intrinsic one). See also
Richard J. Fallon Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-24 (1997) (setting forth four ideal-type
conceptions: the historicist, the formalist, the Legal Process, and the
substantive); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested
Concept (in Florida)?,21 LAW & PHIL. 137, 154 (2002) (summarizing various lists
of features that legal scholars propose should comprise the rule of law). For a
detailed historical exploration of the concept, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE
RULE OF LAW (2004).

184. Stromseth, supra note 3, at 1453 (summarizing
& BROOKS, supra note 3, at 78-80).
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system established. When there is an accident, the people involved
maybe, and
exchange papers and the police take away the car,
8 5
that is all. But we are very abused, here in Nepal.1

Another complained of a lack of government regulation
more broadly:
In Nepal's context, the government has not been able to make
clear policies [regarding transportation] .... [for example] how are
organizations to be registered, how can the government help them,
where does their capital come from, how do they take kids, these
questions.... And in Nepal there aren't options. People don't have
cars. . . I have heard that in Europe, the government manages
everything... how much time transportation takes etc., they have
identified all the needs.... But here they have not identified those
needs. Therefore, public transportation should be put fully under
the government. India is a larger country, much larger than
Nepal. And it is fully government-run. This should be also in
Nepal. We should calculate: on 100km of road, and here, there is
this number of people and over there, that number. How many
buses should we need each day, how many public transportation
vehicles, etc.... This kind of style and standard of bus.... After
that was 186finalized, then service would be dependable, of a
standard.

Thus, even members of the FNTE do not appear to wish
to replace state authority with that of their own. To the
contrary, as these quotations suggest, they desire an
overarching state bureaucracy capable of standardizing and
monitoring the provision of transportation services, even as
they simultaneously reserve the right to disobey some of its
terms.
What, then, do endemic road blockades tell us of Nepali
people's values and beliefs about law? Individuals here are
articulating demands for compensation and social order
marked by some sense of shared social meanings, yet
meanings that are multiple and riddled with contestation
and contradiction. The development practitioner aiming to

185. Lakier, supra note 163, ch. 2 at 27 (quoting Interview with Lal Man
Bhandari, an official in the Bheri Zonal Bus Association, in Kathmandu, Nepal
(Aug. 13, 2003)).
186. Id. ch. 2 at 43 n.48 (quoting Interview with Surya Bahadur Bhattarai,
General Secretary of the Federation of Nepalese Transport Entrepreneurs, in
Kathmandu, Nepal (Aug. 18, 2003)).
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strengthen the ends of law and development through
culture change therefore faces a daunting interpretative
task if she wishes to describe people's values and beliefs as
legible and stable in order to render them subject to change:
a disposition to protest and disruption?; commitments to
feudal forms of social organization that privilege patronage
and social networks?; an intense desire for state
bureaucracy and a rationalized government order?
Moreover, even if she could describe these values and
beliefs accurately, 8 7 how should she then layer culture
change onto this example in order to achieve widespread
commitments "to the orderly and nonviolent resolution of
disputes"? 8 8 The orderly and nonviolent resolution of
disputes appears, to put it bluntly, precisely what a range
of actors surveyed here claim to want-the exchange of
papers, service that is of a standard, police who arrive,
compensation that is forthcoming. It seems clear that
chakka jams are efforts to enlist law in the service of power
enacted through the political association of groups (be they
local villagers or syndicalist monopolies) rather than power
enacted through the neutral and formally equal application
of legal procedure to individual plaintiffs and defendants.
However, it seems equally clear that chakka jams do not
reflect a lack of popular belief in the rule of law or a lack of
legal consciousness in any simple or obvious way. Ordinary
people are articulating values that are similar to the values
that we could imagine the rule-of-law aid community
wishes to instill. But the meaning these values signify for
the people who hold them, and the relations among the
values people hold, the specific contexts in which they act,
and the political economies that allow these values and
practices to circulate, are no simple matters to untanglelet alone place in any relation to institutional reform.
Lakier describes how in response to the disruptive and
unpopular effects of chakka jams and bandhs or general
187. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn'"

Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary
Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 179, 186 (2000) (arguing
that policies designed to change the social meanings of discrete practices, such
as juveniles who "snitch" on other youths carrying guns, require policy makers
to show that "an interpretation of social meaning is not just plausible but
correc").
188. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 75.
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strikes (which require the cessation of commerce and
vehicular travel throughout an entire geographical area),
one prominent Nepali NGO, Pro Public, began a culture
change campaign. 8 9 Founded in 1991 to promote the ends
of good governance, in 2001, Pro Public invited ordinary
citizens to make their voices heard-but through a "Public
Hearing," rather than street protest. 19 0 More ambitiously,
Pro Public initiated a program designed to persuade
Nepalis to adopt "A Why Culture," that is, a culture in
which ordinary citizens hold their public officials
accountable and responsive to their needs, but through
inquisitive, participatory, and civil forms of "asking why" in
venues like the public hearing. 191 In its literature, Pro
Public contrasts these civil practices of question-asking
with what it sees as Nepal's dominant cultural forms:
citizens who are either "of docile character," "indifferent"
and with a "traditional mindset of embracing the status
quo" or, conversely, citizens who "react[] destructively
particularly in matters relating to good governance."' 192
Lakier describes at length how, despite Pro Public's (as well
as other) anti-street protest campaigns, chakka jams and
bandhs persist today. Here, however, let me only note that
to describe these forms as cultural risks obscuring the ways
in which they also represent affirmatively disparate ideals
of participation in public life, as well as affirmative political
contestation over the kinds of public dissent that are both
acceptable and likely to produce movement towards the rule
of law.

189. Lakier, supra note 163, at ch. 6, The Problem of the Bandh Redux: Anti-

bandh Discoursesand the Erasureof the Political.
190. See Pro Public, http://www.propublic.org/index.php (last visited Mar.
31, 2009). To publicize the event, Pro Public ran the following ad in daily
newspapers:
Are you truly "sick" of constant Nepal bandhs? If this is so, we are
organizing a *PUBLIC HEARING* for the purpose of providing your
discontent an outlet. At the program, we are giving you the opportunity
to pose your questions, "keenly but democratically" and "pointedly but
politely," to the organizers of bandhs. Come. Take part! We welcome
you to this practice in democracy.
Lakier, supra note 163, ch. 6 at 6 (Nepali transliterations omitted).
191. See id. ch. 6 at 9-13.
192. PRO PUBLIC, GOOD GOVERNANCE PROJECT 7, 9 (2003) (pamphlet on file

with author).
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To conclude, this example presents people contesting a
multifaceted range of values (competition versus privilege,
substance versus procedure, visibility before the law versus
obedience to its terms, contentious versus civil forms of
political engagement). It does so in order to foreground both
the paradoxes and the politics of representing social
practices such as chakka jams as products of particular
values and beliefs so that interveners can change these
practices by encouraging individuals to adopt different
values and beliefs. To be sure, values and beliefs can
change as a result of exposure to new ideas and influences,
and new ideas and influences can result from development
interventions. My next example examines such an instance.
But it illustrates how even successful instantiations of new
values can inspire a multiplicity of practices.
C. Women, Empowerment, and Maoists
In Nepal, probably the most extreme manifestation of
clashes among various rule-of-law values was the Maoist
insurgency itself. After boycotting the 1994 mid-term
parliamentary elections and forming a splinter political
party, on February 13, 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) 193 commenced a People's War by attacking
agricultural development banks and police posts in the
Western region of the country. 194 Ten days prior to the 1996
attack, leading Maoist ideologue Dr. Baburam Bhattarai
presented the prime minister with forty demands, which
included:
ending
"patriarchal
exploitation
and
discrimination against women," allowing inheritance rights
for daughters, abolishing exploitation and discrimination

193. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) describes its vision as the
"creative application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism [to the] concrete reality of
Nepal." Press Release, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Central Committee
(Dec.
26,
2007),
available at
http://krishnasenonline.org/Bulletin/
press_release.html. Its slogan is "Long live Marxism-Leninism-Maoism &
Prachanda path." Prachanda, the nom de guerre of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, is the

Maoist party chairman and, at the time of this writing, is also Nepal's newly
elected prime minister. For more information on Nepali Maoism and its relation
to the ideas of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, see the party website,
http://www.cpnm.org.
194. See Karki & Seddon, supra note 134, at 22-23; see also Deepak Thapa,
The Maobadi of Nepal, in STATE OF NEPAL 77 (Kanak Mani Dixit & Shastri
Ramachandaran eds., 2002).
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based on race, caste, and ethnicity, equal language rights,
freedom of press and publication, special legal and social
protections for orphans, disabled, and elderly persons, as
well as comprehensive land reform, employment for all,
strict enforcement of minimum wage laws, loan forgiveness
for small farmers, free health and education services, and
the elimination of corruption and bribery. 195 These are
goals, in short, that could easily appear on the
programmatic agendas of a number of mainstream law and
development projects committed to economic development,
egalitarian market participation, and international human
rights.
Notwithstanding many goals laudable from a liberal
legal perspective, Bhattarai's demands were articulated via
violence from the insurgency's beginning. In 1995, the party
declared that 'the greatest responsibility has fallen upon
the revolutionaries to initiate armed struggle against
feudalism [and] imperialism."' 196 And, indeed, soon after
that declaration, Maoists began to "attack police stations
and army garrisons, set off explosions, [and] implement
'people's action' against those seen as 'class enemies,'
'informers,' and 'spies. 1 97 In 2003, these actions prompted
the United States to designate the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist"
organization posing a significant risk to U.S. interests. 198
But notwithstanding the Nepali Maoists' public use of

195. Baburam Bhattarai, 40-Point Demand, in UNDERSTANDING THE MAOIST

supra note 142, app. at 391-95. Other demands included
stopping the "invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs
and INGOs" and banning "imperialist and colonial culture" such as "[v]ulgar
Hindi films." Id. app. at 393.
196. Fujikura, supra note 146, at 26 (quoting Strategy and Tactics of Armed
Struggle in Nepal, a resolution adopted in 1995 by the Third Plenum of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)).
197. Thapa, supra note 194, at 77.
198. Determination Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224
Relating to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 68 Fed. Reg. 62158 (Oct.
31, 2003). At the time of this writing, the designation still stands. As a result,
Maoists are "excludable from entry into the United States," and U.S. citizens
are barred "from transactions such as contribution of funds, goods, or services
to, or for the benefit of, the Maoists." See Press Release, Bureau of Consular
Affairs,
Department
of
State,
Travel
Warning
Nepal,
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis-patw/tw/tw_927.html (last visited March 1,
2009).
MOVEMENT OF NEPAL,
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violence, it is equally the case that from the beginning,
Bhattarai's demands were aimed at replacing an "allpowerful autocratic monarchy" with a "bourgeois
democratic republic" through elections to a constituent
assembly. 199 As scholars of Nepal explain, Maoist demands
"for a constituent assembly, a new, more democratic
constitution and the establishment of a popular democratic
republic in Nepal ... were, from the very early days of the
'200
Communist Party of Nepal, central and major objectives.
Or in Bhattarai's words:
Our party, our party Chairman Prachanda and our various
publications have time and again stressed that our immediate
political agenda is to consummate a democratic republic in the
country. Please note that we are not pressing for a 'communist
republic' but a bourgeois democratic republic. For that we have
advanced the immediate slogans of a roundtable conference of all
the political forces, an interim government and elections to a
constituent assembly, which have been increasingly endorsed by
an overwhelming majority of the population. As the constituent
assembly is the highest manifestation of bourgeois democracy in
history, we fail to understand why20 1anybody claiming to be a
democrat should shy away from this.

Although a thorough analysis of the Nepali Maoist
movement, and its complex and contentious relation to the
Nepali state is beyond the scope of this Article, a glimpse at
the strikingly high rate and visible roles of rural women
participating in the Maoist struggle provides another
fruitful point of analysis for neocultural interventionist
projects. Many scholars have documented the various roles
of women in the Maoist movement; women participate "as
cultural activists, members of village defender groups,
couriers, guides, nurses ... combatants and spies. ' 202 And
according to Hisila Yami, wife of Bhattarai and former head
of the Women's Front, "in the Maoist strongholds, every
third guerilla is a woman. In the new districts . . . every
tenth combatant is a woman ....
Some of the most violent

199. Email Interview by Chitra Tiwari with Baburam Bhattarai, in
supra note 142, at 329, 331.
200. Karki & Seddon, supra note 134, at 3.
201. Tiwari, supranote 199, at 331.
202. Gautam et al., supra note 144, at 114.
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actions against local 'tyrants' are associated with all-women
guerilla squads. '203 Comrade Parvati, another leading
female Maoist figure, similarly argues that the "MarxistLeninist-Maoist forces are steeling women to strike
violently against the system
that has been responsible for
their double exploitation. '204
The conventional diagnosis of the radicalization of rural
Nepali women (as well as men and youth) blames poor
governance for failing to meet the needs of those in poverty
and despair-what some scholars term the "failed
development thesis. '205 A good example of this thesis is
proffered by USAID in its 2004 Congressional budget
justification: "poor governance and corruption ... and lack
of infrastructure all contribute to its development gains
being unevenly distributed ....
The Maoist insurgency...
has found fertile ground largely in response to Nepal's
''
poverty, exclusion, and poor governance. 206
The Maoists, for their part, both embrace but also resist
this diagnosis. They explain their affirmative ideological
agenda more readily through a global structural critique of
"gross inequality, oppression, poverty, underdevelopment
and exploitation of the overwhelming majority of the
population in a class-divided and imperialism-dominated
world" rather than (or in addition to) evidence of
development's incomplete unfolding in Nepal. 20 7 As Maoist
Chairman Prachanda explains: "For the masses there is no
alternative to rebellion and revolution, given the objective
background of exploitation, repression and poverty

203. Id.
204. Comrade Parvati, Women's Participationin the People's War, in THE
PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL, supra note 134, at 165, 182. For other analyses of the
role of women in the Maoist movement, see Li ONESTO, DISPATCHES FROM THE
PEOPLE'S WAR IN NEPAL 166, 164-82 (2005) (describing how many "women really
believe that the fight against women's oppression is woven into the fabric of this
People's War"); Shakya, supra note 149, at 375-404.
205. For detailed descriptions of this position, see generally Fujikura, supra
note 146; Lauren Leve, 'Tailed Development" and Rural Revolution in Nepal:
Rethinking Subaltern Consciousness and Women's Empowerment, 80
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 127 (2007).
206. USAID, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS 1 (2004),
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/asianeareastNepal.pdf., quoted in
Leve, supra note 204, at 138.
207. Tiwari, supra note 199, at 329.
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prevalent in the semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries of
the Third World. '208 As one potential illustration of the
ideological difference between the USAID and the Maoist
positions, consider the response of one Maoist to the
common refrain that the advent of national education that
exceeded employment opportunities for rural Nepali youth
led many of these unemployed youths to embrace the
Maoist cause. "If unemployment was the reason," this
Maoist youth argued, "it would have made us not
Maobadis
209
(Maoists), but Jagiri-badis (Employment-ists).
In response to the "failed development" thesis (in either
of its USAID or Maoist formulations, which, in different
ways, link the insurgency to development's failures), some
activist scholars have examined how the successes of
development-its values, products, and techniques-may
have created new collective political imaginations that
enabled Nepali Maoist ideologies to take root. Consider, for
example, Fujikura's analysis of Nepali education. He
examines how a modern system of national education
fostered collective ideals sympathetic to the Maoist agenda.
He argues that "for the past several decades in Nepal, the
project of national development aggressively promoted a
view that it was necessary to have a formal education in
order to become a kind of person who could help others and
that, as an educated person, the primary way to help others
was through helping to develop the nation." 210 He proposes
that the diffusion of this view paradoxically aided the
Maoists in fostering "a particular-revolutionary -way of
envisioning the world" that included "the absolute
imperatives of progress and improvement, necessity of a
radical rapture with the past in order to bring out authentic
progress, a group of educated 'youth' as those privileged to
bring about that change, and the Nepali' 211
nation as both the
object and ground for real development.
Human rights activists and scholars Shoba Gautam,
Amrita Banskota, and Rita Manchanda proffer a similar
claim about women's empowerment. As early as 1995, the
208. Interview with Comrade Prachandra,in UNDERSTANDING THE MAOIST
MOVEMENT OF NEPAL, supranote 142, at 211, 212.
209. Fujikura, supra note 146, at 24.
210. Id. at 25.
211. Id. at 28.
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USAID Mission in Nepal redirected significant amounts of
funding from programs to reform parliamentary and
judicial institutions to programs to train rural women '212
in
"basic literacy, legal literacy, and economic literacy.
Nepal, in fact, was one of the first countries to see women's
empowerment as a USAID 'strategic objective.' 213 And
anthropologists have long since criticized women's
development programs in Nepal for seeking to cultivate
neoliberal forms of personhood-what Katharine Rankin
calls "rational economic woman. ' 214 Gautam, Banskota, and
Manchanda, however, argue that at least among women in
the western Gorkha district, woman's empowerment has
promoted a very different kind of female subject. These
scholars suggest that Gorkhali women's support for the
Maoist insurrection reflects the achievements of a local
development program to change how women comprehend
themselves and how they comprehend concepts like justice
and equality. 215 More specifically, Gautam, Banskota, and
Manchanda draw links between a U.S. INGO program
administered in the 1980s (prior to the USAID push 216) to
engage rural Gorkhali women in topics such as poverty,
gender inequality, and corruption as a means to promote
literacy and empowerment, and the fact that many of the
subsequently empowered women supported the Maoist

212. CAROTHERS, supra note 1, at 116-17. Carothers reports that this "go
local' trend in Nepal" reflected budget cuts as well a perception that political
elites were unresponsive to USAID's reform efforts. Id. at 117, 319. Leve, who
refers cynically to USAID's women's empowerment projects in Nepal as
"literacy-law-and-loan" programs, reports that in one year alone USAID
"enrolled over 100,000 women in six or nine month literacy courses ..., [n]early
43,000 women 'were provided legal awareness and advocacy skills,"' and many
thousands were given access to micro-credit. Leve, supranote 205, at 140-41.
213. Lauren G. Leve, Between Jesse Helms and Ram Bahadur:Participation
and Empowerment in Women's Literacy Programming in Nepal, 24 POL. &
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 108, 112 (2001).
214. Katharine N. Rankin, Governing Development: Neoliberalism,
Microcredit,and Rational Economic Woman, 30 ECON. Soc'Y 18 (2001); see also
Leve, supra note 213, at 119.
215. See Gautam et al., supra note 144, at 120-22.
216. Unlike literacy courses today, which Leve argues are "treated primarily
as a lead-in to income generation classes, microcredit programs, or savings and
loan groups," this older U.S. INGO-sponsored literacy program was modeled
after Brazilian pedagogist Paulo Freire's democratic approach to adult
education and community self-help. Leve, supra note 205, at 135.
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uprising for its democratizing ends. 217
Quantitative and qualitative research over a ten-year
period suggests that the literacy program in Gorkha
achieved many of its intended effects: graduates expressed
greater confidence, willingness to speak in public, and
support for the education of girls and equal treatment of
sons and daughters. And the Gorkha district boasts female
literacy rates slightly higher than the national average. 218
Additionally, at least according to Gautam, Banskota, and
Manchanda:
In Gorkha district, it is literate women and men who are joining
the struggle. Ironically, it is the success of the adult literacy
campaign which has paved the way for women to become active in
the public life of the community, for girls to go to schools and
for
2 19
girls politicised in school to be drawn into the armed struggle.

And:
Young women have been politicised in schools, the adult literacy
classes and NGO-sponsored income generation women collectives..
. .Literacy campaigns supported by INGOs designed to promote
the empowerment of women, inadvertently encouraged many
conscientised young women to choose subsequent empowerment
2 20
through armed struggle.

The Gorkhali women did not become rebel guerrillas,
but they provided Maoists with material and ideological
support and protection. As Leve explains, these women
"support the rebels by feeding them, housing them, and,
most importantly, not informing the government about
their activities or whereabouts .... [W]ithout their support,
these women told me, the insurgents would be lost.'' 221 Thus
like the families of victims of traffic accidents staging
chakka jams, these "ordinary" women appear to act in the
name of values such as equality and social justice. But they
do so through support for public and private violence that
preempts or subverts the predictable, bureaucratic, and
217. See Gautam et al., supra note 144, at 120-22.

218. Id. at 120.
219. Id. at 120.
220. Id. at 121.
221. Leve, supra note 205, at 131.
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rule-bound operation of legal processes. These efforts,
again, are in tension with most accounts of the rule of law
that rest "significantly on the assumption that legal process
is superior to violence as a means of resolving conflicts. '222
In an effort to make sense of these women's
radicalization, Leve (who had worked previously with this
and many USAID women's empowerment programs in
Nepal) visited Gorkha with the aim of discovering "a sense
of what was important to them and what sort of people they
think themselves to be. ' 223 She spoke with graduates whose
narratives clearly support Gautam, Banskota, and
Manchanda's claim that successful development programs
helped align these women with the Maoist agenda. "When I
asked one woman about why people in [the area] supported
the insurrection," Leve writes, "her answer was succinct:
'the Maoists work for social justice. . . .' When I asked her if
she remembered when she first began to use that term
and/or the ideals it expresses, she thought for a moment
224
and then replied: 'in the adult literacy course.'
For her part, however, Leve tries to understand the
Gorkhali women's support for the Maoist insurgency not
simply as "empowerment"-a concept that rests on
modernist notions of individual consciousness, autonomy,
and agency. And she reports narratives that are ambivalent
and in many senses prosaic. 225 Many women in Gorkha
expressed clear objections to "the violence and everything

that came with

it. ' ' 226

Yet many blamed politicians and

democracy-not the Maoists-for the material insecurity
and violence in their lives, and urged the government to
concede the Maoists' demands. 227 But some were
nonetheless opposed to the Maoists' efforts to emancipate
women through the eradication of gendered custom and
ritual observances and preferred to maintain traditional
practices such as the observance of menstrual taboos. 228

222. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN

& BROOKS, supranote

223. Leve, supranote 205, at 163.
224. Id. at 137.
225. See id. at 141-42.
226. Id. at 159.
227. Id. at 148.
228. Id. at 148-49, 162.

3, at 312.
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And most spoke to Leve of their desires and allegiances not
and
radical
revolutionary
agency
by
discussing
consciousness (or even social justice, for that matter), but
rather by discussing ordinary and relational commitments:
being the sort of person who is willing to make sacrifices on
behalf of others, negotiating their families and their social
obligations, and desiring things like "ease, security,
equality of opportunity (including access to education and
employment), good food and clothing, some degree of
personal desires-and, as much as
respect for their '229
possible, some fun.
Leve proceeds to describe how two oppositional ideas"self-interest versus being-for-others, and pain and trouble
versus ease and fun"-shaped, in different ways, the
thinking of many women she encountered. 230 To offer a
striking example, one very successful graduate of the
literacy program accepted employment with the police
academy in Kathmandu. Although her vocation made her a
Maoist target, she too supported the insurrection. In her
words:
What can we do? It's difficult. We have to educate our children....
Who wouldn't want to live having fun? No one wants to face such
pain, do they? At night when we sleep in our room, if someone
knocks on the door, we feel they've [Maoists have] come to kill us.
That's the kind of fear we live with.... What they [the Maoists]
are doing is good. They're doing it for us. It's very good to say that
rich and poor will be the same. We're scared because they will kill
us because of our jobs, and it shouldn't be like that. We are doing
these jobs because we have to. Otherwise, though, they're [Maoists
are] not bad. Actually, if police/army recruits die and if Maoists
die, it's the same-all are sons and daughters of Nepal. But they
[Maoists] aren't fighting for personal benefit. They're fighting
without any salary, but we're fighting for our personal benefit. In a
way, we're selfish. Because if we don't have a job, we won't be able
to feed our kids, so we've become involved. But they don't get a

229. Id. at 151. Leve writes further that '"Development' (bikds) might also
be placed on this list. If so--again based on what they told me-it would include
water taps, electricity, bridges and roads, and peace." Id. at 166 n.43. She
describes these expressions as striking because the women "were almost
certainly familiar" with Maoist critiques of "development as a form of violent
imperialism," id. at 158, and, as such, Leve suggests they could reflect genuine
political commitments as well as rhetorical opportunism (given Leve's own links
to development programs). Id. at 167 n.51.
230. Id. at 150 (Nepali transliterations omitted).
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salary. They're fighting knowing that they may die today or
tomorrow. We're fighting for our own self-interest, and they're
31
fighting for the country. 2

The implications of these values and desires-to live a
life with fun, to live with the absence of violence and pain,
to live under social conditions of class equality, to sacrifice
oneself for others, to educate one's children, to be selfless in
the face of the demands of a nation-for the failures and
successes of development, and their relation to why people
do or do not support armed struggle, are too large and
surely too indeterminate to tangle with here. 232 But what
Leve's
ethnography
clearly
demonstrates
is how
impoverished culture change becomes when it is articulated
as a set of normative prescriptions (any set) extracted from
the structural, material, interpersonal, and psychological
contexts that allow analysts to use culture to produce
knowledge about people that is both legible and enduring as
well as simultaneously unstable and beyond the grasp of
any easy or generalizable development expertise. At
bottom, Leve's ethnography is an effort to make sense of the
ways in which these women's desires, choices, and
relationships reflect continuities with prior forms of social
organization, and, to the extent they reflect breaks, what
those breaks mean to the Gorkhali women who embody
them in particular historical, social, and political contexts.
Be it through legal rights education, women's literacy,
or micro-finance,
neocultural
interventionists
have
proposed that local development programs can generate
processes of self-transformation that produce both marked
and manageable change. That is, these programs would
produce people who come to hold different values and selfunderstandings about law and development yet who
willfully channel these values into behaviors that follow
predictable and manageable directions (such as towards
liberal institutions comprising the rule of law and not
towards street protests or radical social movements). But
Leve's example stands suggestively to complicate both these
ends. The problem Leve uncovers for culture change
projects is not that the Gorkhali women either changed or

231. Id. at 149-50.
232. See id. at 160-62.
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failed to change as a result of women's empowerment
projects-some clearly articulated what appear to be new or
enhanced cultural commitments to values and practices
desirable from a liberal rule-of-law perspective, such as the
education of girls, market employment, and other forms of
social equality. Rather, the problem resides in deciphering,
let alone driving, the degree and direction of these selftransformations abstracted from the social conditions that
help to shape both these "selves" and their potential
continuities and transformations.
IV. LESSONS FROM ETHNOGRAPHY

I have argued that the neocultural interventionist
paradigm conceptualizes culture in two related forms: first,
as conscious values and beliefs that individuals possess,
and, second, as lawlike social rules that produce social
behavior and social relations in reasonably predictable
ways and, once changed, can produce social behavior and
social relations in reasonably predictable different ways.
My examples, however, suggest that deploying these
conceptualizations of culture as the basis of social change
projects can involve particular kinds of limitations and
forms of misrecognition. Grappling with these limitations
and forms of misrecognition is crucial because, as I see it,
the very reason to think with culture in law and
development is because it compels to remember that
questions of development always involve questions of how
233
we understand people.
A. Culture as Consciousness
We have seen people who, rather than lack conscious
desires for either the substantive or procedural values that
development and the rule of law are thought to encode,
instead articulate explicit desires for the kinds of values

233. In some contemporary contexts, moreover, the stakes of thinking with
culture are quite high. Consider the U.S. Military's "Human Terrain System," a
program to enlist anthropologists to produce knowledge about people in Iraq
and Afghanistan. See Kambiz Fattahi, US Army Enlists Anthropologists, BBC
NEWS, Oct. 16, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/americas/7042090.stm;
David Rohde, Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2007, at Al.
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neocultural interventionist projects may wish to instill. One
problem, it thus seems, with conceptualizing culture as the
values and beliefs that individuals possess is that similar
values and beliefs across different contexts can be difficult
to observe. Crowds of people that blockade roads in the
aftermath traffic accidents can reasonably appear to a
development practitioner as instances of lawlessness
accompanied by the values and beliefs (whatever these are)
that underlie a lawless state of affairs. Or, they could
appear, as they do in Lakier's ethnography, as performative
interventions intended to trigger the application of law in a
substantive form (compensation) and arguably also in a
non-bureaucratic and quasi "procedural" form (compensation
administered by state law enforcement officials). 234
Describing development challenges through ethnographic
detail therefore not only reveals how programs designed to
instill general values and beliefs into ordinary people can
sometimes be redundant. It also reveals how specific
normative labor is always involved in interjecting "local
context" into acontextual projects of law reform-and hence
challenges neocultural interventionists to articulate more
precisely the specific normative assumptions motivating
their programs to use culture to change people, opening
these assumptions to question and debate. Consider, once
more, the different forms programmatic interventions
would likely take if development planners described chakka
jams as a manifestation of people's inadequate legal
consciousness or cultural relation to law (and therefore
perhaps amenable to pedagogical efforts to instill "A Why
Culture") or, conversely, as an illustration of people's
disparate, even paradoxical, views about the role of coercive
protest to compensate for an inadequate state bureaucracy
and to demand legal reform.
Neocultural interventionists are looking for alternatives
to help answer some of the most intransient rule-of-law
problems on the ground. They have proposed working in the
domain of culture as means of understanding and, if
possible, trying to reform ordinary citizens' values and
beliefs about development and the rule of law. But, as we
have seen, the analytical categories they wish to reformvalues and beliefs-are capable of holding multiple and

234. See supra Part III.B.
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shifting forms of meaning. One consequence of this
ambiguity is that culture change projects can not only
routinely fail to produce their intended effects, they can
simultaneously succeed in keeping practitioners everhopeful of culture's power. Culture change can always
appear to be a goal within reach-planners may need to
readjust their methods, scale them down, make them, this
time, perhaps less technical
and more about people's
"actual" values and beliefs. 235 But there is a far more basic
normative problem lurking beneath efforts to change
popular consciousness to strengthen law. Most succinctly
put, based on the values they articulate and practices they
enact, are the people staging chakka jams believers in or
believers against development and the rule of law?236

235. Other scholars have documented a tendency among planners to
represent contestational practices as amenable to reform through the tools of
policy expertise. In development literature, anthropologist James Ferguson
offers a classic account of this thesis. See generally JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTIPOLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT," DEPOLITICIZATION, AND BUREAUCRATIC
POWERS IN LESOTHO (1990). As one example, consider Cynthia McClintock's

argument against claims that peasant orientations are highly resilient to
change. She examined the left Peruvian government's efforts in the 1960s and
1970s to promote a new ethos of "self-management." CYNTHIA MCCLINTOCK,
PEASANT COOPERATIVES AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN PERU 14 (1981). What she

describes are complex processes of self-transformation: peasants who properly
transformed hierarchical and deferential orientations into collaborative and
assertive ones within new agrarian cooperatives, yet who simultaneously "did
not seem to worry whether or not satisfaction of their needs would hurt other
peasants in the area [outside of the cooperative], or whether or not their action
would damage the cooperative movement as a whole." Id. at 18. Based on this
data, McClintock reasons that the challenge confronting other policy makers
who wish to engage in similar projects of individual reform is not that "citizens'
attitudes and behavior change too slowly." Id. at 20. Rather the task is figuring
out how to craft "new structural amalgams and incentives" capable of
transforming attitudes and behaviors in ways that are more in line with policy
makers' ultimate goals. Id. Failure, in McClintock's analysis, as in many others,
thus becomes a bid for better planning and techniques. Cf. Jorge L. Esquirol,
The FailedLaw of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2008) (exploring how a
discourse of "failed law" in Latin America serves principally to justify ever more
projects aimed at reforming law and legal institutions in the region).
236. See generally Waldron, supra note 184. Building on linguistic
philosopher W.B. Gallie's idea of essentially contested concepts, Waldron
suggests that the rule of law comprises rival conceptions each vying to capture a
shared ideal, but the ideal and the normative purposes it serves are themselves
subject to debate-to articulate them is to participate in the contestation. Id. at
148, 151, 158-59.
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B. Culture as Lawlike Rules
I also argued that the neocultural interventionist
project conceptualizes culture as a surrogate to the
instrumental and regulatory force of law. It does so when it
envisions that culture change can produce reasonably
predictable changes in social behavior in contexts where
projects of legal change alone appear incapable of achieving
similar regulatory ends. To complicate this vision, I offered
Fitzpatrick's representation of culture as a relation between
social meaning that is capable of producing determinate
social effects and meaning that is always liable to produce a
multiplicity of social practices because it remains
responsive to other social and material structures. As a
suggestive illustration, I offered Leve's description of
women graduates of empowerment programs who, once
"empowered," cast their lot with Maoist insurgents fighting
on behalf of what insurgents represented as (and what in
the early months of the Maoist coalition government now
actually
appear to be) liberal political and economic
7
ideals. 23
237. The Maoists have recently extended their longstanding dual political
commitment to "the bullet and the ballot" to a moderate public-private
approach to economic policy. In a recent meeting between Prachanda and the
Nepali business community, Prachanda spoke of "fusion theory" modeled on the
economies of Malaysia and South Korea. Josy Joseph, Maoists Talk Peace with
Nepali Businessmen, DNA-WORLD
(Apr.
17,
2008), available at
http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1160065. Similarly, in a recent
interview, Bhattarai explained that:
[w]hen we say we want to end feudalism, we don't mean we want to
end private ownership. Our economic development is in our language
bourgeoise democratic revolution, in other words, collectivisation,
socialisation and nationalisation is not our current agenda. All we
mean to say is that for a weak and backward economy like ours the
state must play a facilitating and regulatory role. Without monetary
and tax policies foreign interests may be more dominant, so the state
has to protect the domestic private sector and the free market .... We
would like to assure everyone that once the Maoists come [into
government] the investment climate will be even more favourable....
Our other agenda is economic development and for this we want to
mobilise domestic resources and capital, and also welcome private
foreign direct investment. The only thing we ask is to be allowed to
define our national priorities.
Interview
with
Baburam
Bhattarai,
Nepali
Maoist
Leader,
http://worldviewsblog.blogspot.com/2008/04/interview-with-baburam-bhattarainepali.html (Apr. 17, 2008, 01:04:00 PM).

2009]

THINKING WITH CULTURE

579

To be sure, culture, like law, can offer resources to
mobilize social change in specific normative directions, and
cultural interveners can contribute to those processes. My
own research during a year spent living in Nepal examined
some such positive instances. I studied donor-funded
mediation projects that emerged out of a development
agenda dedicated to decentralization and court reform. In
particular, I studied how activist NGOs added the language
of democracy and international human rights to U.S.
mediation's language of interests and efficiency. 238 Along
precisely the lines Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks
suggest, 239 a group of NGOs used mediation as a forum to
promote a 'democratic attitude and an attitude of legality"'
and to challenge "traditional practices and superstitious
beliefs that lead to the violation of human rights. ' 24° In fact,
local organizers explicitly conceived of mediation trainings
as consciousness-raising meetings; as one NGO director put
it: 'everyone brings their voice to talk about rights . . . this
[project] is also about raising awareness among the general
population.' 241 And at least among some local users, these
mediation projects were producing some of their intended
cultural effects. 242 Female participants, for instance,
reported that they used mediation to make interior
representations on behalf of themselves in public and
cognizable terms and to make their abuses and abusers

238. Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics,
Power, and Practice in Nepal, 11 HARv.NEGOT. L. REV. 295, 337-51 (2006).
239. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 3, at 338-40.

240. Cohen, supra note 238, at 325, 344 (quoting THE CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF
TORTURE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COMMUNITY MEDIATION: ANALYSIS OF
CASES 1 (2004), available at http://www.cvict.org.np/pub.html); cf. Stacy Leigh
Pigg, The Credible and the Credulous: The Question of "Villagers' Beliefs" in
Nepal, 11 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 160, 163-65 (1996) (exploring how cultural
distinctions between modernity and tradition construct local as much as global
discourses).
241. Cohen, supra note 238, at 340 (quoting Interview with DN Parajuli,
Director, Human Rights Forum, in Ilam, Nepal (Mar. 17, 2003)) (transcript on
file with author).
242. The project's ultimate aim-that the local invocation of a transnational
vocabulary of human rights through village-level mediation would over time
have constitutive effects not only among local users, but through such users, the
state-was, of course, far more difficult to find any empirical evidence in
support. See id. at 345.
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publicly known. 243
But these intended cultural effects only capture part of
a complex story. Indeed, part of what Leve's ethnography
suggests is that neocultural interventionists need not only
"adapt" transnational development discourses to fit the
lives of ordinary people. They also need to attend to the
constitutive effects of these discourses on social life as
ordinary people reproduce them through repeated social
practices in specific contexts. 244 For example, many female
mediation participants described the empowering and
equalizing effects of mediation by contrasting themselves
with other women-specifically,
women with "low
consciousness" or with consciousness yet to be raised.245
Fujikura has observed that "development discourses in
Nepal have not only insistently labeled those identified as
the 'underdeveloped' part of the population as somehow
lacking in consciousness, but have also helped create
conditions in which variously positioned people speak 246
in
terms of the state of their own and others' consciousness."

243. Id. at 345-46.
244. For ethnographic descriptions of what anthropologist Sally Engle
Merry refers to as the "vernacularization," or the appropriation and translation,
of global discourses of human rights, see SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE

(2006).
245. Cohen, supra note 238, at 346.
246. Discourses of Awareness, supra note 151, at 271. For other explorations
of the ways in which discourses of development have shaped selfunderstandings and social relations in Nepal, see LAURA M. AHEARN,
INVITATIONS TO LOVE: LITERACY, LOVE LETTERS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEPAL

(2001); Leve, supra note 212; Stacey Leigh Pigg, Inventing Social Categories
through Place: Social Representations and Development in Nepal, 34 COMP.
STUD. SOC'Y & HIST. 491 (1992). For an account of how development discourses

produce knowledge about development beneficiaries for development planners,
see Seira Tamang, The Politics of 'Developing Nepali Women,' in STATE OF
NEPAL, supra note 193, at 161, 165-66. Tamang, a Nepali scholar and activist,
argues:
Whether as "expert consultant," office worker or field officer. . . "uppercaste" Hindu women [perform] the key role of "native informants" for
the non-Nepali speaking donor experts and aid bureaucrats. [They are]
[u]nquestioned in their authority-being Nepali and being female-to
produce information about "Nepali women". . .. The continual use of
the term "Nepali women are.. ."and "Nepali women need.. .." by these

representatives helps create and propagate the omnipresent fictive
"Nepali mahila [woman]": uniformly poor, illiterate and choked by
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And in mediation, as in many other development projects in
Nepal, participants used vocabularies of development to
reproduce local hierarchies (gender, class) as well as to
247
contest them.
I have therefore proposed a more intimate engagement
between neocultural interventionist proposals to deploy
lawlike conceptualizations of culture to change social
behavior with ethnographic observations that suggest
culture can represent meanings that are simultaneously too
precise and grounded in context and practice, on the one
hand, and too unstable and indeterminate, on the other, to
pursue particular policy ends. I conclude this Part with a
description of the constitutive relation between law and
culture that probably best captures my pastiche of
examples.
Consider Robert Cover's foundational linkage of law
and culture or, more specifically, his insight that "[n]o set of
legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the
narratives that locate it and give it meaning" and that
therefore the "creation of legal meaning-'jurisgenesis'takes place always through an essentially cultural
medium." 248 Neocultural interventionists link law and
culture in an analogous way. Brooks, for example, argues
that "[i]n some societies that lack a shared normative
commitment to the rule of law," law is unlikely to have any
immediate effect on ordering, distributing, or giving
meaning to experiences like violence and suffering. 249 "Only
nonlegal initiatives" that offer "alternative narratives that
assign new cultural meaning to violence and suffering"
potentially can. 250 This is why, to articulate Brooks'
prescriptions in Cover's terms, she aims to enlist
development practitioners in, quite literally, the "worldcreating" practice of making legal meaning through what

Hindu

patriarchal

superstition. .

.

domination, not

to

mention tradition

and

. As subjects of "development," then, the women of

Nepal are homogenised as those "who do not know" and who are in
need of having "their consciousness raised."
247. See Cohen, supranote 238, at 347, 351 n.193.
248. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV 4,
4-5, 11 (1983).
249. Brooks, supra note 3, at 2322.
250. Id.
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Cover calls paideic modes of engagement: projects that are
and marked by the production
pedagogical, person-specific,
251
of common narratives.
But what Cover proceeds to argue is that intrinsic to
the world-creating practice of making legal meaning is "the
problem of the multiplicity of meaning-the fact that never
only one but always many worlds are created by the too
fertile forces of jurisgenesis. '' 252 "Let loose, unfettered," he
writes, "the worlds created would be unstable and sectarian
in
in their social organization, dissociative and incoherent ''253
their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions.
We therefore need law-in its "world-maintaining" formnot to create, but rather to work upon, regulate, and
channel plural sites of legal meaning into an organized and
disciplined form of social order. Thus, "the sober imperial
mode of world maintenance holds the mirror of critical
objectivity to meaning, imposes the discipline of
institutional justice upon norms. '254 Norms, in this mode,
"are universal and enforced by institutions. They need not
'255
be taught at all, as long as they are effective.
Cover thus places the generative work of creating legal
meaning in tension with the imperial work of maintaining
legal order. By contrast, neocultural interventionists
hypothesize that culture change interventions can induce
people to create new substantive sources of legal meaning
that can in turn help to produce universalizing and selfdisciplining legal forms. In other words, where Cover
appears to see culture as a location of contested legal
meanings that generate, but also require, law in its
imperial form to impose definitional clarity onto plural sites
of meaning, the turn to culture in law and development sees
culture as a medium through which individuals can
potentially, albeit not easily, reach agreement on the value

of imperial law. 256

251. Cover, supra note 248, at 12-13.
252. Id. at 16.
253. Id.
254. Id. Cover writes further: "[We unleash] upon the fertile but weakly
organized jurisgenerative cells an organizing principle itself incapable of
producing the normative meaning that is life and growth." Id.
255. Id. at 13.
256. Brooks, for example, describes the rule of law as grounded in a
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Or to put this one final way, even if the neocultural
interventionist project achieves a shift location and scalefrom judges and lawyers to mediators, paralegals, and
ordinary people-the practices people engage in, and the
extant meaning they ascribe to these practices are, as
Fitzpatrick suggests, historically and contextually situated
257
and enduring and emergent, dynamic, and responsive.
This is why we should expect interventions aimed at
reorienting people, and their legal values, beliefs, and
practices, to run directly into Cover's observation "that
never only one but always many worlds are created by the
too fertile forces of jurisgenesis. ' ' 25 8 This is also why I am
proposing we should attend to the dangers that can flow
from representing culture-a form of social ordering
invariably linked to material and social conditions and sites
of social struggle-as virtually analogous to an (idealized)
image of law: as explicit social rules capable of inducing
social change in a reasonably predictable normative
direction. On the one hand, deploying homologous
representations of law and culture as the basis of
development projects may simply mean that exporting
projects of culture change, just like exporting projects of
legal change, will produce some successes, many failures,
and a host of unintended effects. On the other hand, efforts
to evolve lawlike conceptions of culture risk obscuring the
emancipatory and violent forces that can inhere in the
tensions and indeterminacies of culture itself.
CONCLUSION

I am not suggesting that culture change projects will
have no effect, positive or negative, on the ground. As
anthropologist James Ferguson puts it: "intentional plans
are always important, but never in quite the way the
planners imagined. . . . intentional plans interact[ ] with
unacknowledged structures and chance events to produce
unintended outcomes which turn out to be intelligible not
collective decision: "When societies decide that law is a good mechanism to
regulate and assign meaning to violence, changes in formal law can indeed lead
to changes in the amount and nature of violence." Brooks, supra note 3, at 232223.
257. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 46, at 6-7.
258. Cover, supra note 248, at 16.
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only as the unforeseen effects of an intended intervention,
but also as the unlikely instruments of an unplotted
strategy. 259 Indeed, in 2005 when the King of Nepal
declared emergency rule, the Nepal Bar Association
articulated its objections to his usurpation of power in the
"instrumentalist" language of first-wave culture change
projects-language that first-wave law and development
scholars retrospectively feared would diminish the capacity
of the legal profession to act "as a potential source of
opposition to state policy. '260 "We, the lawyers are social
engineers," the Nepal Bar Association pronounced, "and we
cannot remain silent towards the incidents and
developments arising against . . . rights of the sovereign
people. "261

I have instead suggested that we should understand the
contemporary turn to culture as a tool of governance-as an
effort to implement the rule of law through the self-ordering
of individual people, and as the idea that through culture
interveners can make law and development internal and
can regulate individuals from the inside. To capture this
idea, I suggested that neocultural interventionists want
culture to accomplish highly particular regulatory work.
They want culture to change people's conscious values and
beliefs about law (I called this culture as consciousness).
And they want these values and beliefs to constrain and
determine social behavior when the rules of law alone
cannot (I called this culture as lawlike rules). And perhaps
most suggestively, neocultural interventionists want
culture to shape people who come to see law and
development in similar terms as they do. In this way, they
risk eliding the conflictual nature of concepts like law and
development.
My ethnographically grounded accounts of culture
served to illustrate some of the gaps, conflicts, and blind
spots that will likely accompany law and development
projects that seek to transform the consciousness and
behaviors of ordinary people into a field of governance.

259. FERGUSON, supra note 235, at 20.
260.

GARDNER, supra note

10, at 101.

261. Resolution on Human Rights, Rule of Law and Independence of
Judiciary, Adopted by the General Assembly of Nepal Bar Association (June 4,
2005), www.nepalbar.org/activities.html (emphasis added).
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Stepping back from my specific examples in Nepal, we could
observe further that a key lesson of cultural analysis is that
actors engage with the world through their conceptual
frameworks and in turn are shaped by these engagements.
This lesson is no less relevant for development planners
than it is for development beneficiaries. Development
planners should grapple, then, with how thinking with
culture as a conceptual tool to design development policy
constitutes their own knowledge about development and
their attendant capacities to comprehend the limits of that
knowledge.
In the early 1980s, a group of scholars criticized what
they saw as the first wave of law and development's narrow
field of vision. Fitzpatrick, for example, argued that "[t]he
outer limits of acceptable change allowed for by theorizing
on law and modernization is that law must somehow be
more responsive to 'the disaffected' and 'the poor', [but]
basically to reconcile them to existent structures of
power." 262 Boaventura de Sousa Santos similarly suggested
that law and development studies emphasized "the positive
role of law-an ideological bias in favour of lawful social
transformation and against revolutionary processes. And
thus they become, whatever the intentions of their
cultivators, little more than a rhetoric of legitimation. 2 63
These concerns remain prescient today. At the time of this
writing, the Nepali Maoists have been voted into power.
After years of violent struggle, they won a landslide number
of seats in elections to a constituent assembly and are
dismantling a 240-year-old monarchy 264 -demonstrating, in

262. PETER FITZPATRICK, LAW AND STATE IN PAPUA

NEW GUINEA 48 (1981).

263. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Science and Politics: Doing Research in

Rio's Squatter Settlements, in LAw AND SOCIAL ENQUIRY: CASE HISTORIES OF
RESEARCH 261, 270 (Robin Luckham ed., 1981), quoted in FITZPATRICK, supra
note 261. In fact, as committed as some of today's legal scholars are to
promoting the rule of law in the name of progressive social change, others are
now challenging these efforts in language reminiscent of Left indictments of
first-wave reforms. The problem for these critical scholars is less about
formalism or insufficient attention to culture than about confronting the ways
in which the rule of law itself serves the interests of global capital against the
class interests of the world's poor. See UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER:
WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL (2008).
264. In April 2008, Nepal held elections to a constituent assembly to draft a
new constitution. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) won thirty-eight
percent of the total elected seats, a significantly larger percentage than any
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very present ways, the conflictual forms through which
social transformations sometimes happen and both the
possibilities and limitations of law and culture as tools of
change.
Decades of law and development practice have resigned
us to the manifold challenges that flow from efforts to
transplant law and legal institutions in their imperial and
disciplining forms. Inviting people themselves to imagine
the disciplining worlds that development planners wish
them to inhabit through voluntary culture change is
perhaps more seductive, but likely no less illusory, and
perhaps even more so if we mistakenly frame a turn to
culture as a turn to context itself. Of course, there is no way
to know whether the vision driving the turn to culture in
the scholarship I have examined-stable, equitable,
peaceful, and prosperous social orders in which all human
subjects are governed in good faith by law-will ever be
possible to achieve. But there seems every reason to
conclude that to live and work as if it were possible will
require us to confront, at nearly every turn, the contentious
politics of social change.

other of Nepal's major political parties. See THE CARTER CTR., FINAL REPORT ON
OBSERVING NEPAL'S 2008 CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTION 11,

14 (Nov. 10,

2008) (reporting that "the majority of reports received by The Carter Center
indicate that the electoral process overall was a credible reflection of the will of
the people'), www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfsnewspeace._publications/election
_reports/FinalReportNepal2008.pdf. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
subsequently formed a coalition government, and in August 2008, its Party
Chairman Prachanda was elected prime minister.

